InfoSec Compliance & AI Governance For over 20 years, DISC InfoSec has been a trusted voice for cybersecurity professionals—sharing practical insights, compliance strategies, and AI governance guidance to help you stay informed, connected, and secure in a rapidly evolving landscape.
Your biggest enterprise customer just sent a security questionnaire. Question 14 reads: “Do you have an AI management system?”
If your honest answer is “we have a policy somewhere,” the deal can stall. Procurement wants proof, not intent. Their security team wants to know which AI touches their data, who owns the risk, and what happens when it goes wrong.
Most companies already use AI everywhere: in the product, in support, in sales tools and in browser plug-ins nobody approved. Very few can show that it is governed. That gap is now showing up in revenue, not just in audits.
Paper AIMS vs operational AIMS
An operational AI management system is one that runs every week and leaves evidence behind. A paper AIMS is a set of documents that describe a system nobody operates.
ISO/IEC 42001 makes the difference testable. Clauses 4 to 10 are mandatory, and an auditor will ask for records, not slides. Enterprise buyers increasingly ask the same questions.
What gets asked
Paper AIMS answer
Operational AIMS answer
Which AI systems do you use? (Clause 4)
A list from last year
A live AI system register, including shadow AI, with an owner per system
Who is accountable? (Clause 5)
“The CTO, generally”
A signed AI policy and named owners for each system and risk
How do you assess AI risk? (Clause 6)
A generic risk matrix
An AI risk register and impact assessments tied to real use cases
How do you control AI in production? (Clause 8)
A policy says so
Change records, supplier AI reviews, human-oversight checks, incident logs
How do you know it works? (Clause 9)
We’d find out
Metrics, internal audit reports and management review minutes
What do you fix? (Clause 10)
Ad hoc
A corrective action log with closure dates
If your answers sit in the middle column, you do not have an AIMS yet. You have its outline.
Why it matters now
Four forces are turning AI governance from a nice-to-have into a sales requirement.
Buyers are asking. AI questions now sit in standard vendor assessments next to SOC 2 and ISO 27001. A vague answer adds weeks of follow-up, legal review and, sometimes, a lost deal.
AI threats move fast. In our recent post on the Optimizely attack, one poisoned vendor script reached 178 major brands in a single day. AI chat widgets, copilots and agents are embedded the same way, and they see what users type. Prompt injection, data leakage and excessive agency are no longer lab problems.
AI risk hides in plain sight. Shadow AI is the norm: staff paste contracts, code and customer data into tools security never reviewed. You cannot govern what you have not found.
Regulation has arrived. The EU AI Act, the Colorado AI Act and sector rules for financial services all expect documented risk management and human oversight. ISO 42001 gives you one management system that maps to all of them, and it integrates with the ISO 27001 program you may already run.
How ShareVault certified on the first audit
We helped ShareVault, a virtual data room for M&A and financial due diligence, certify to ISO 42001 on its first audit. Financial data rooms are the hard mode of compliance: sensitive documents, demanding clients and AI built into the product. Three moves made the difference.
We mapped AI use cases first, including shadow AI. Before any policy, we built the AI system register: product features, internal tools, vendor AI and the unofficial tools staff actually used. We also settled the scoping question early, because ShareVault is both an AI provider and an AI user. That register became the backbone of Clause 4 and of every control that followed.
We built the risk register before writing policies. Policies written first tend to be generic and hard to evidence. We ran the AI risk assessment and impact assessments (Clause 6.1) against real use cases, then wrote policies to treat the risks we actually found. Every policy had a reason an auditor could trace.
We collected audit evidence as we went, not at the end. Evidence production is where most programs fail. Decisions, reviews, supplier assessments and training records were captured as the work happened. When the auditor asked “show me,” the answer already existed.
Answer these honestly. Each “no” is a gap a buyer or auditor will find.
☐ We can list every AI system in use today, including tools staff adopted on their own.
☐ Each AI system has a named owner and a documented intended purpose.
☐ We have an AI risk register with ratings, treatments and review dates.
☐ AI system impact assessments exist for systems that affect customers or individuals.
☐ AI vendors are assessed before onboarding and reviewed after.
☐ We test AI features for prompt injection, data leakage and misuse.
☐ AI incidents have a defined response path, and we have practiced it.
☐ Leadership reviews AI risk on a schedule, and the minutes prove it.
If you ticked fewer than six of these eight, your answer to the AI question on your next customer questionnaire is a risk to your pipeline
My perspective
I have yet to see an AI governance program fail for lack of a policy. I have seen many stall because nobody could prove the policy was followed.
ISO 42001 was new when we took ShareVault through Stage 2, and there was little audit precedent to lean on. What carried us was not clever documents. It was a management system that already ran, so the audit became a demonstration rather than a scramble.
That is my advice to every SaaS and financial services leader facing Question 14. Do not start with a policy template. Start by finding your AI, then rank its risk, then build the controls and the evidence together. A defensible answer is closer than you think, and it pays for itself the first time a deal does not stall.
How DISC InfoSec builds an operational AIMS
We turn AI governance requirements into operating controls, evidence and accountable decisions. One practitioner across AI governance, AI security and compliance, with a first-audit ISO 42001 certification behind the method.
Clause 4–10 and Annex A gaps with a prioritized remediation roadmap
Ready to build
AIMS implementation
AI system register, risk register, policies and audit evidence built together
Need ongoing leadership
vCAIO services
AI governance leadership without a full-time hire
Every engagement follows the ShareVault pattern: find the AI, rank the risk, then govern and prove it. It also covers AI security, including prompt injection and AI supply chain risk, mapped to ISO 42001, ISO 27001, NIST AI RMF and the EU AI Act.
“DiscInfosec” HD – AICP, CISSP, CISM, ISO/IEC 42001 and 27001 Lead Implementer, is Principal Consultant at DISC InfoSec, a PECB Authorized Training Partner.
When AI becomes the gatekeeper of human consciousness. We keep asking if AI will take the throne. I think we already handed it over.
Nov 19, 2026 · @disc
The inscription above the gate
Above the entrance, one line is carved into the stone: “Before you govern the world, examine what governs your mind.”
The initiate does not get the answers at the door. He earns them. Through discipline, through silence, through years of learning which questions are worth asking.
Fast forward a few thousand years. We are standing in front of another temple.
Its walls are made of data. Its priests are algorithms. Its inner chambers belong to whoever owns the compute, the models, and the platforms.
And something fundamental has flipped.
The ancient initiate found wisdom by questioning. The modern citizen increasingly receives the answer before discovering which question deserved to be asked.
AI is not just speeding up human thought. It is becoming part of the architecture that organizes thought, validates it, and monetizes it.
So before we argue about governing AI, I want to ask an older, harder question.
Do we actually understand our own minds? Have we conquered them? Or are we handing the keys to a temple we never finished exploring?
The governance paradox
Here is the paradox I keep running into.
We spend enormous energy debating whether machines will become intelligent enough to govern humanity. Conferences, op-eds, think-tank reports.
Meanwhile, we pay far too little attention to the institutions that already govern the machines.
Who picked the training data? Who decided what the model optimizes for? Who tuned the ranking that decides which answer you see first? Who profits when you stop asking and start accepting?
Those decisions are being made right now. Mostly in rooms most of us will never enter.
You can’t govern a mind, yours or your organization’s, if you can’t see what is shaping it.
Have we conquered our own minds?
Honest answer: no. Not individually, and certainly not collectively.
As Earth Soldier Unveiled reminds us, cognition is never fully neutral. Our thinking carries the imprint of trauma, history, culture, inherited beliefs, and influences we never consciously signed up for.
We perceive the world through experiences we didn’t always choose, shaped by environments we didn’t design.
Now take all of that conditioned human experience and turn it into training data.
That is exactly what AI learns from. It inherits fragments of our collective consciousness:
our brilliance and our prejudices
our creativity and our contradictions
our hard-won knowledge and our unexamined assumptions
Then it processes those fragments at extraordinary speed and scale. And it hands back interpretations that feel objective, simply because they came from a machine.
That is the trap. A biased answer from a person invites a second opinion. A biased answer from a system carries the borrowed authority of math.
So let me say it plainly:
Speed is not wisdom. Prediction is not understanding. Infinite information is not infinite consciousness.
In security terms, this is an integrity problem. Not of a file or a database. Of human judgment itself.
Who governs the machine that shapes your mind
If AI is becoming a gatekeeper of thought, governance has to reach every layer of the gate. In practice I see five. Each one shapes what you end up believing, and each one needs an owner, a control, and proof.
1. The data: what the machine remembers
The model only knows what it was fed. Gaps, skew, and poisoned samples become its worldview.
Risk: inherited bias and blind spots presented as neutral fact.
Threats: data and model poisoning (OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications, LLM04); training-data poisoning in MITRE ATLAS.
Control: documented data provenance, quality checks, and representativeness review before training or fine-tuning.
Evidence: a data lineage record and a signed-off data quality assessment per dataset.
2. The model: what the machine believes
The model compresses that data into patterns. It can be confidently wrong, and it can be pushed.
Risk: hallucination and misinformation delivered with machine confidence.
Control: pre-release evaluation for accuracy, bias, and robustness, plus adversarial testing.
Evidence: evaluation results and red-team reports tied to the exact version you shipped.
3. The objective: what the machine wants
Every system optimizes for something: engagement, conversion, time on page, cost per answer. That target quietly decides what “good” means.
Risk: a system tuned to keep you clicking, not to keep you informed.
Threats: excessive agency (LLM06) when objectives drive autonomous action; manipulation that the EU AI Act treats as a prohibited practice.
Control: objectives documented and approved against intended purpose, with an AI system impact assessment covering individuals and society.
Evidence: an approved intended-use statement and a completed impact assessment.
4. The interface: what the machine shows you
Ranking, defaults, summaries, and auto-complete decide which answer arrives first. The first answer usually wins.
Risk: answers arriving before questions; people stop verifying.
Threats: sensitive information disclosure (LLM02) and system prompt leakage (LLM07) at the interface; overreliance on output.
Control: transparency that the user is interacting with AI, source attribution, and human oversight where decisions matter.
Evidence: a disclosure on the interface and an oversight log showing what reviewers saw, changed, and why.
5. The owner: who governs all of the above
Someone owns the infrastructure, the roadmap, and the revenue model. That is the real throne.
Risk: authority concentrated where nobody inside your organization can see it.
Threats: supply chain risk (LLM03), vendor features switched on by default, shadow AI that skipped intake.
Control: named accountability, an AI inventory, and supplier assessment for every third-party model.
Evidence: an AI inventory with owners and a supplier review on file.
Across all five, my rule holds: if the artifact doesn’t exist, the control doesn’t either.
the architecture behind an AI answer · 5 layers
Influence flows down from whoever owns the system to the answer on your screen. Governance has to flow back up: from your mind to every layer that shaped what you were shown.
Mapping the layers to the frameworks
None of this needs a new framework. The standards we already have cover every layer, if we actually operate them.
Layer
ISO/IEC 42001
NIST AI RMF
EU AI Act
Data
Annex A.7 (data for AI systems: quality, provenance, preparation)
Map, Measure
Art. 10 (data and data governance)
Model
Annex A.6 (AI system life cycle: verification, validation)
Measure
Art. 15 (accuracy, robustness, cybersecurity)
Objective
Clause 6.1.4 and Annex A.5 (AI system impact assessment)
Verify clause and article references against the current published texts before using them in an audit.
Why it matters for humanity
I’m not arguing against AI. I’m arguing for keeping the human mind sovereign while we use it.
When people stay in charge of the questions, AI’s upside is enormous and shared:
Health: clinicians who use AI to spot patterns earlier, while still owning the diagnosis.
Pandemic readiness: faster sequencing and modeling across borders, because viruses don’t check passports.
Climate: better forecasting and grid optimization, guided by people who decide what trade-offs are acceptable.
Science: hypotheses generated at machine speed, tested with human skepticism.
Education: a tutor for every student, if it teaches them to question rather than just to receive.
Security: defenders who triage at scale, with analysts who still ask “does this make sense?”
In every case, the benefit depends on the same thing: a human who examined what governs their own mind before trusting what the machine returned.
What I see in the field
I led a virtual data room provider, through ISO/IEC 42001 Stage 2 certification on the first audit attempt. Financial data rooms are the hard mode of compliance. M&A teams and auditors test every control, and they test it hard.
The lesson that stuck with me: the hardest part of AI governance is not the machine. It is the people’s relationship to the machine.
Three patterns show up again and again, at virtual data room-scale companies and much larger ones:
Shadow AI that skipped intake. A sales rep’s meeting recorder, a browser plugin, a vendor feature switched on by default. Nobody decided to adopt it. It just arrived, and started shaping work.
Oversight as a checkbox. “Human in the loop” on paper, with no record of what the reviewer saw, changed, or why. That is not oversight. That is a signature on autopilot.
No retirement plan. Systems that nobody owns anymore, still answering questions, still trusted because they always were.
Each one is the organizational version of an unexamined mind. Influence nobody noticed, authority nobody chose, habits nobody questions.
My view: the unseen throne
We keep asking whether AI will take the throne.
I think that is the wrong fear.
The most dangerous throne is not the one a machine occupies. It is the one whose authority we no longer recognize we have surrendered.
It happens quietly. One accepted summary at a time. One default left unchanged. One question never asked because the answer was already on the screen.
So here is my challenge to every leader, CISO, and board member reading this:
Examine your own mind first. Where has your team stopped verifying AI output?
Examine your organization’s mind. Which AI systems shape decisions today that nobody formally approved?
Examine the architecture. For each one, who owns the data, the model, the objective, the interface, and the business model behind it?
Shift AI: question the architecture before accepting the intelligence.
Free tool: examine your own AI governance first
The inscription says examine yourself before you govern anything else. That applies to organizations too.
The DISC InfoSec AI Governance Gap Assessment is a quick, honest self-examination. It asks 15 questions about how your organization actually governs AI today.
What you get:
An instant AI governance maturity score
Your top 3 priority gaps
A detailed PDF report you can share with leadership
How to read your results through this post’s lens: if your lowest scores sit around ownership and inventory, your throne is already unseen. Start there, before you write another policy.
DISC InfoSec (Deura Information Security Consulting LLC) is a boutique AI governance and cybersecurity consultancy in Petaluma, California, and a PECB Authorized Training Partner. “DiscInfosec” Deura, AICP, CISSP, CISM, ISO/IEC 42001 Lead Implementer, ISO/IEC 27001 Lead Implementer. Contact: info@deurainfosec.com | (707) 998-5164 | deurainfosec.com
Sources
Earth Soldier Unveiled, on the conditioned nature of human cognition (as referenced in Disc’s original LinkedIn reflection)
Where Organizations Should Start With Their AI Agent Security
Nov 18, 2026 · @disc
Your agents already have keys. Do you know which doors they open?
A chatbot answers. An agent acts.
It reads your inbox, queries your CRM, opens a ticket, pushes a config change, and calls another agent to finish the job. Often with a service account nobody remembers creating.
That shift changes the security question. It is no longer “what did the model say?” It is “what did the agent do, with whose authority, and could we have stopped it?”
Most organizations I talk to are not short on frameworks. They are short on a starting point. So here is the one I use with clients: five steps, in order, each one producing evidence you can show an auditor or a board.
Discover where AI is being used
Understand what it can access
Get runtime visibility and control
Test AI before you deploy it
Make agents accountable
Skip step one and every step after it is guesswork. You cannot secure an agent you don’t know exists.
The five-step baseline for AI agent security
In my last post I argued that an agent is only as secure as its harness: the tools, identity, memory, and orchestration wrapped around the model. This post answers the follow-up question I got most: fine, but where do we start?
Start here. Each step below names the risk, the threats (mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications), the control, and the evidence. Evidence is the part most programs skip. If the artifact doesn’t exist, the control doesn’t either.
01 — Discover where AI is being used
You can’t secure an agent you don’t know exists. And in most organizations, agents arrive sideways: a SaaS vendor flips on an “AI assistant” by default, a developer wires a coding agent to the repo, a sales rep connects a meeting recorder to the CRM.
None of them went through intake. All of them have credentials.
Risk: Shadow agents operating outside any risk assessment, with no owner and no review date.
Threats: ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities (unvetted MCP servers, plugins, skills); ASI03 Identity & Privilege Abuse (orphaned service accounts and API keys).
Control: A living agent inventory fed by more than a survey. Pull from SSO and OAuth grant logs, API gateway traffic, cloud billing, browser extension inventories, and vendor release notes. Make AI intake a gate in procurement and change management.
Evidence: An agent register with owner, business purpose, model and version, risk tier, and next review date for every entry. Plus the discovery queries you ran and when.
02 — Understand what it can access
Once you know an agent exists, the next question is blast radius. What can it read? What can it write? What can it call? Whose identity does it act under?
The most common finding in my assessments is not a clever attack. It is an agent running on a shared, long-lived API key with far more access than its job requires.
Risk: Excessive agency. An agent with production write access, a payments API, and an email tool is one prompt injection away from a very bad day.
Threats: ASI02 Tool Misuse & Exploitation; ASI03 Identity & Privilege Abuse; ASI06 Memory & Context Poisoning (what data and memory the agent can read is what an attacker can poison).
Control: Give every agent its own workload identity. Scope credentials to the task and make them short-lived. Map each agent’s tools, data classes, MCP connections, and memory stores. Then tier it: assistive, controlled action, privileged autonomous, or high-impact.
Evidence: An Agent Security Profile per agent: identities, tools, data classes, external connections, maximum action impact, and an access review signed by a named owner.
03 — Get runtime visibility and control
A policy that says “agents must not exfiltrate data” is a wish. A gateway that blocks an unapproved destination is a control.
Runtime is where the agent actually does things, so it is where security has to live. That means seeing every tool call and being able to say no to the ones that break policy, before they execute.
Risk: Agents acting on attacker-controlled instructions with nobody watching and nothing able to stop them.
Threats: ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack (indirect prompt injection through emails, documents, web pages); ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution; ASI08 Cascading Failures across chained agents.
Control: Route tool calls through a policy enforcement point outside the model. Allowlist tools and destinations. Validate parameters. Set rate and transaction limits. Require human approval for high-impact actions. Build a kill switch and test it.
Evidence: Tool-call logs tied to agent identity, policy decision logs (allowed and denied), alert history, and a dated kill-switch test record.
04 — Test AI before you deploy it
We don’t ship web apps without testing them. Agents get shipped on a demo that went well.
A good demo tells you the agent works when everyone is friendly. Testing tells you what it does when someone isn’t.
Risk: Unknown failure modes discovered in production by customers or attackers.
Threats: All ten OWASP ASI categories, with priority on ASI01 Goal Hijack, ASI02 Tool Misuse, ASI06 Memory Poisoning, and ASI07 Insecure Inter-Agent Communication. MITRE ATLAS gives you adversary techniques to build scenarios from.
Control: A pre-deployment gate. Run direct and indirect prompt injection, tool parameter manipulation, privilege escalation, poisoned RAG and memory, malicious MCP server, and data exfiltration tests. Re-run them as regression tests whenever the model, prompt, tools, or permissions change.
Evidence: Test plans, red-team results with severity, remediation tickets, retest results, and the go/no-go decision with who signed it.
05 — Make agents accountable
When an agent does something wrong, “the AI did it” is not an answer a regulator, a customer, or a board will accept.
Every agent needs a human who owns its purpose, its permissions, and its outcomes. And every material action needs a trail that lets you reconstruct who authorized what.
Risk: No one owns the outcome, so no one fixes the cause.
Threats: ASI09 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation (rubber-stamp approvals); ASI10 Rogue Agents (behavior that drifts outside its mandate and nobody notices).
Control: A named business owner and technical owner per agent. Formal risk acceptance for privileged agents. Human oversight that is a real review, not a checkbox. Reassessment triggers on any model, tool, or permission change. An incident response playbook written for agents.
Evidence: Ownership records, risk acceptance sign-offs, oversight logs showing what the reviewer saw and decided, reassessment history, and incident drill results.
The baseline at a glance
AI agent security baseline · 5 steps, each with its evidence
Read it left to right: each step depends on the one before it, and each leaves an artifact you can show an auditor. The loop at the bottom is the part most programs forget.
How the five steps map to the frameworks you’re already using
None of this needs a new framework. It is the agent-specific way to operate the ones you already have.
Step
OWASP Agentic Top 10
ISO/IEC 42001
NIST AI RMF
EU AI Act
01 Discover
ASI03, ASI04
Cl. 4.3 scope; Annex A.4 resources (AI system inventory)
GOVERN 1.6 (AI inventory); MAP 1
Art. 6 classification; Art. 26 deployer duties
02 Access
ASI02, ASI03, ASI06
Cl. 6.1.2 risk assessment; Annex A.7 data for AI systems; A.10 third-party
Verify clause, subcategory, and article references against the current texts before using this in an audit. EU AI Act obligations depend on your role (provider or deployer) and the system’s risk classification.
Why this is worth getting right
I don’t write about agent security because I want organizations to slow down. I write about it because the upside is real and worth protecting.
Agents that triage patient messages free clinicians for patients. Agents that comb through research literature speed up science. Agents that watch logs around the clock catch intrusions humans would miss at 3 a.m. Agents that handle routine paperwork give small teams the reach of large ones.
Every one of those benefits depends on trust. One high-profile agent incident, an exfiltrated data room, a wrong payment, a deleted production database, sets back adoption for everyone.
Security is what lets agents earn more autonomy, not what takes it away.
What I’ve seen in the field
When I led Virtual Data Room through ISO/IEC 42001 Stage 2 certification on the first audit attempt, the environment was a financial data room. Controls there get tested hard, because the data is M&A material and the auditors know it.
The MCP Governance Standard I wrote for ShareVault came from the same five questions in this post. Which agent connections exist? What can each reach? Who approved it? How do we see and stop it? Who owns it?
Three patterns show up again and again, at ShareVault-sized companies and larger ones:
Shadow AI that skipped intake. The riskiest agent is usually the one nobody registered, because it also never got scoped, tested, or monitored.
Oversight as a checkbox. “Human in the loop” means little if the record shows only an approval click. Real oversight leaves a log of what the reviewer saw, what they changed, and why.
No retirement plan. Agents get deployed. They rarely get decommissioned. Their credentials outlive the project, and the pilot from last spring still has a live token.
None of these are exotic. All of them are fixable with the five steps above.
My perspective: where agent security stands today
Here is my honest read, as of late 2026.
Adoption is running well ahead of control. Agents are being deployed at the speed of a SaaS toggle. Security is moving at the speed of a policy review cycle. That gap is where incidents come from.
We are still securing the model instead of the agent. Too much effort goes into system prompts that say “never do X.” A prompt is an instruction, not a control. The model can be talked out of it. A policy engine sitting outside the model cannot.
Identity is the weakest link. Most agents I review don’t have their own identity. They borrow a human’s OAuth token or share a service account. When something goes wrong, the logs can’t tell you whether a person or an agent did it. Non-human identity is now the front line.
MCP and agent-to-agent connections are the new supply chain. Teams install MCP servers the way they once installed browser extensions: quickly and without review. Every connection is a trust decision, and most are being made by default.
Testing is still demo-driven. Very few organizations run adversarial tests before go-live, and fewer re-run them when the model or tools change. An agent that passed last quarter’s review may be a different agent today.
The good news: the frameworks have caught up. The OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications, ISO/IEC 42001, and the NIST AI RMF give us a shared language. What’s missing is execution, not guidance.
How to improve it, starting this quarter
Give every agent its own identity. Short-lived, scoped credentials. No shared keys. No borrowed human tokens. This one change makes steps 02, 03, and 05 possible.
Move authorization out of the prompt. High-impact actions get approved by a policy engine or a human, never by the model’s own judgment. Practice least agency, not just least privilege.
Treat MCP servers, plugins, and skills like third-party software. Approved registry, version pinning, vendor review, and the ability to revoke fast.
Make testing continuous. Every change to the model, prompt, tools, or permissions triggers the regression suite. Red-team at least before launch and after major changes.
Log for reconstruction, not just debugging. Can you replay what the agent saw, decided, called, and changed? If not, you can’t investigate an incident or defend one to an auditor.
Define the off switch before the on switch. Kill switch, credential revocation, and rollback, tested and dated, before any privileged agent goes live.
Govern it as a management system. Agents change weekly. A one-time assessment ages fast. ISO/IEC 42001 gives you the loop: assess, treat, monitor, improve, repeat.
The organizations that get this right won’t be the ones with the fewest agents. They’ll be the ones that can say, for every agent, what it is, what it can touch, what it did, and who answers for it.
Free tool: find out where your agents are exposed
If you read the five steps and weren’t sure how you’d score, start with the DISC InfoSec AI Vulnerability Scorecard. It’s free and gives you a quick, honest view of where your AI systems are exposed.
What you get:
A score across the AI security areas that matter for agents
A view of your weakest areas, so you know which step to start with
A report delivered to your inbox that you can share with your team
How to read your results through this post: if your lowest scores sit around inventory and ownership, start at step 01. You’re securing agents you can’t see. If they sit around access and logging, jump to steps 02 and 03. That’s where your blast radius lives.
DISC InfoSec (Deura Information Security Consulting LLC) is a boutique AI governance and cybersecurity consultancy in Petaluma, California, serving B2B SaaS and financial services firms. We are a PECB Authorized Training Partner. Hugh “Disc” Deura, Principal Consultant, holds the CISSP, CISM, ISO/IEC 42001 Lead Implementer, and ISO/IEC 27001 Lead Implementer credentials, and led ShareVault through ISO/IEC 42001 Stage 2 certification on the first audit attempt. Contact: info@deurainfosec.com · (707) 998-5164 · calendly.com/hd-deurainfosec
Sources
“Where organizations should start” five-step graphic (supplied image)
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (OWASP Agentic Security Initiative)
ISO/IEC 42001:2023, Artificial Intelligence Management System
NIST AI Risk Management Framework 1.0 and NIST AI 600-1 Generative AI Profile
Cyber Attack Hits Major Websites: 178 Brands, One Trusted Script, Zero Breaches of Their Own
Nov 17, 2026 · @disc
On Monday, November 16, visitors to Zoom, the BBC, CNN, HSBC, IKEA, Salesforce, Equifax, GitLab and roughly 170 other brands were served malicious JavaScript. None of those companies had their own servers breached. The code arrived through a tool they all trusted: Optimizely, the A/B testing platform their marketing teams use to tweak web pages.
That is the lesson worth sitting with. These organizations spend millions on firewalls, EDR, pentests and audits. The attacker skipped all of it and walked in through a script the browser was already told to trust. If your website loads code from someone else’s server, your attack surface includes that someone else’s signup page.
What happened
Scott Helme and the team at Report URI spotted the attack the same day. They pulled 1,611 distinct Optimizely snippets and found malicious code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organizations. They believe the real number is higher, because they could only check the snippets they found in time (Report URI).
Time (UTC, Nov 16)
Event
02:21
Last clean capture of the BBC’s Optimizely snippet
04:21
First injected snippet observed
08:28
Main payload seen loading on bbc.com
21:52
One infected organization still serving the code
23:11
Every monitored file clean
The payload was a multi-tool. It swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker’s own, skimmed payment card fields, and collected cookies and page screenshots. iPhone and iPad visitors were pushed toward iOS exploit kits, though successful exploitation has not been demonstrated (SecurityWeek). By Monday evening, wallets tied to the attack had collected about $7,040, mostly in Bitcoin (CoinDesk).
Optimizely says it fixed the flaw and removed the code. What nobody can say yet is how many card numbers or credentials were taken. Salesforce, for one, disabled Optimizely scripts as a precaution while it investigates (The Next Web).
How it worked: one flaw, 178 victims
The attacker did not hack 178 companies. They found one weakness and let the vendor’s own distribution network do the rest.
Optimizely says an unauthorized party exploited a flaw in its account signup flow to insert code into customer projects (CoinDesk). The code went into the optional “Project JavaScript” field, which runs on every page that loads the snippet. Everything else in the snippet stayed untouched (The Hacker News).
That design detail is what made it so effective. The tampered file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com, with Optimizely’s own certificate, from a host every affected site had already allow-listed. Even companies that self-host the snippet on their own domain were hit, because the content came from the same compromised project (Security Affairs). Optimizely’s own website and login portal were on the infected list (The Register).
Read that root cause again: a signup flaw that let an outsider write into other customers’ projects. That is not exotic. It is a broken authorization and business-logic bug, the same class of defect that shows up in multi-tenant SaaS assessments every month.
Why this matters: your browser is part of your supply chain
Most third-party risk programs look at vendors that hold your data or touch your network. Few look at the vendors whose code runs inside your customers’ browsers on every page view. Analytics tags, chat widgets, tag managers, personalization and A/B testing tools all fall in that blind spot. They are usually bought by marketing, installed with one line of JavaScript, and never reviewed by security.
The Register put it bluntly: all that money spent securing corporate websites, and the way in was a tool marketing uses to tinker with pages. A clean pentest of your own code would not have caught this. Neither would a SOC 2 report on your infrastructure.
The controls already exist. Regulators have simply moved faster than most programs:
PCI DSS v4.0.1 Requirement 6.4.3 requires an inventory of every script on payment pages, a written justification for each, and a method to confirm integrity.
PCI DSS v4.0.1 Requirement 11.6.1 requires a mechanism to detect unauthorized changes to payment page content and HTTP headers, and to alert on them.
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.5.19 to A.5.22 cover supplier relationships, security in supplier agreements, ICT supply chain security, and monitoring of supplier services.
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.28 and A.8.29 cover secure coding and security testing, which is where client-side integrity controls belong.
If an auditor asked you tomorrow which third-party scripts run on your checkout page, who approved them, and how you would know if one changed at 04:21 UTC, could you answer?
The AI angle: the same pattern, with more autonomy
There is no evidence AI was involved in this attack. But the pattern it exploited is exactly the one AI is multiplying across every organization: trusted third-party components that load and execute instructions at runtime, outside your change control.
Think about what now sits in that position. AI personalization and chat widgets embedded in customer-facing pages. Copilots and plugins pulling content from vendor endpoints. MCP servers and agent tools whose manifests and behavior can change after you approve them. Agentic browsers that read web pages and act on what they find. Swap “malicious JavaScript in a trusted snippet” for “malicious instructions in a trusted tool or page” and you have indirect prompt injection and tool poisoning, both on the OWASP Top 10 lists for LLM and agentic applications.
The difference is consequence. A skimmer steals what a visitor types. A compromised agent tool can act with whatever permissions you gave the agent: move data, send messages, change records. The blast radius of a trusted-component compromise grows with the autonomy you grant.
That is why AI governance and supplier security are now the same conversation:
ISO/IEC 42001 A.10.3 requires you to manage suppliers of AI systems and components, not just sign their contracts.
NIST AI RMF GOVERN 6 addresses third-party AI risk, including software and data supply chains, and MAP 4 asks you to map those components’ risks.
EU AI Act Article 26 puts monitoring duties on deployers, even when the model or tool comes from someone else.
The Optimizely incident is a preview. Today it is a card skimmer in an A/B testing script. Tomorrow it is a poisoned tool definition in the agent that handles your customer support queue.
What to do now
If you visited an affected site on November 16: review card statements for unfamiliar charges, and ask your bank about a replacement card if you paid online that day. If you sent cryptocurrency, check that the receiving address matched the one you intended. Update iPhones and iPads to the latest iOS. Report URI’s post lists all 178 organizations and their domains.
If you run a website or SaaS product, this week:
Inventory every third-party script on your site, starting with login, checkout and account pages. Include who owns each one and why it is there.
If you use Optimizely Web, review your Project JavaScript field and audit project access and change history for November 16.
Remove scripts nobody can justify. Load the rest only on the pages that need them, not site-wide.
Deploy a Content Security Policy that restricts script sources and outbound connections, starting in report-only mode, and use Subresource Integrity for static third-party files.
Monitor scripts on payment pages for unauthorized changes, as PCI DSS 11.6.1 already requires.
This quarter:
Bring marketing and analytics tools into your vendor risk program. A one-line tag is still a supplier with code execution in your customers’ browsers.
Extend the same inventory to AI components: models, plugins, MCP servers, agent tools and AI widgets, with owners and approved versions.
Test your own multi-tenant boundaries. The Optimizely root cause was a signup and authorization flaw. Ask whether a new account on your platform could write into another customer’s data or configuration.
My take as a practitioner
When I walk into a new engagement, I ask for the list of third-party scripts on the login and payment pages. I almost never get one on the first try. I get the list of vendors in procurement, and the two lists rarely match.
The Optimizely attack is not a story about one vendor’s bad day. Optimizely had already disclosed a separate vishing-related breach in February. Every SaaS provider will have a bad day eventually. The story is about how many organizations had no way to notice, for up to 19 hours, that code running on their own domain had changed.
The fix is not exotic either. Know what runs. Know who approved it. Know when it changes. Test your own authorization boundaries as hard as an attacker would test your vendor’s. And as AI agents and tools join your stack, apply the same discipline before they get permissions, not after.
Trust is not a control. Verification is.
Find the flaw before someone else does: DISC InfoSec Application Security Assessment
The attack on 178 organizations started with one flaw in one application’s signup flow. That is exactly the kind of weakness our application assessments are built to find.
DISC InfoSec uncovers potential vulnerabilities in your web applications using comprehensive automated and manual testing. We specialize in identifying weaknesses in authentication, authorization, business logic, APIs, configuration and session management. Automated scans give coverage. In-depth manual testing finds the logic flaws scanners miss, like a new account that can reach into another tenant’s data.
We use Burp Suite Pro and OWASP ZAP for cloud-based web application testing, combining AI automated tools with targeted manual testing of application logic. You get personalized expert guidance at every stage of the engagement, with a special focus on remediation, so findings become fixes rather than a report on a shelf.
For teams shipping AI features, we extend the same rigor to the AI layer, mapping findings to ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 42001 and the NIST AI RMF so your test results double as audit evidence.
Contact us to schedule your test today. Discounts are available for first-time customers and for recurring assessments.
Hugh “Disc” Deura, CISSP, CISM, ISO/IEC 42001 and ISO/IEC 27001 Lead Implementer, is Principal Consultant at DISC InfoSec. Book a call at calendly.com/hd-deurainfosec.
The AI System Lifecycle: 7 Stages Where AI Governance Is Won or Lost
Nov 16, 2026 · @disc
Governance that lives in a binder never touches the model
Most AI governance programs fail in the same place: they govern a moment, not a lifecycle. A policy gets approved, a risk assessment gets filed at launch, and then the model keeps changing while the paperwork does not.
AI systems are not static software. Their data shifts, their behavior drifts, their vendors switch on new features, and their agents pick up new permissions. A control that was true on launch day can be false six weeks later.
ISO/IEC 22989 is an international standard developed by ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42 that establishes foundational concepts and shared terminology for artificial intelligence (AI).
ISO/IEC 22989, the AI concepts and terminology standard, describes seven stages every AI system passes through. Dejan Kosutic walks through them in Advisera’s 7 Stages of the AI System Lifecycle for AI Governance video, and they are the right backbone for an ISO/IEC 42001 AI management system. Below, I map each stage to the risk it creates, the threat that exploits it, and the control and evidence that close it.
In our last post we argued that AI is a shared civilizational challenge, and that stewardship starts with the people who build and run these systems. The lifecycle is where that stewardship becomes operational.
The 7 stages, and what governance must do at each
1. Inception
The organization decides whether an AI system should exist at all: the problem, the intended purpose, the stakeholders, and the success criteria.
Risk: a use case nobody assessed. This is where shadow AI is born, when a team buys a tool or wires up an API without the question ever reaching governance.
Control: intake and approval for every new AI use case, an AI system impact assessment, and a regulatory applicability check (EU AI Act risk tier, Colorado AI Act, sector rules).
Evidence: an AI inventory entry with a named owner, the documented intended purpose, and the impact assessment.
2. Design and development
Requirements, architecture, data sourcing, model selection or training, and for agents, the tools and permissions they will hold.
Risk: biased or unrepresentative data, unvetted third-party models, and agents designed with more access than any human would get.
Threats: data poisoning, supply chain compromise of models, libraries and MCP servers, and backdoored open-weight models.
Control: data provenance and quality requirements, vendor and model due diligence, threat modeling (STRIDE plus MITRE ATLAS), least-privilege agent design with scoped credentials and tool allowlists.
Evidence: design documentation, data lineage records, supplier assessments, and the threat model.
3. Verification and validation
Proving the system was built right (verification) and that it is the right system for its purpose (validation) before anyone relies on it.
Risk: testing accuracy on clean data while ignoring fairness, robustness, and adversarial behavior.
Threats: prompt injection, jailbreaks, sensitive data leakage, and excessive agency from the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications.
Control: documented acceptance criteria, bias and robustness testing, AI red teaming, and a formal go/no-go sign-off.
Evidence: test plans and results, red-team findings with dispositions, and the release approval.
4. Deployment
The system moves into its production environment and reaches real users, data, and decisions.
Risk: configuration drift between test and production, missing transparency notices, and no rollback plan.
Control: change management, secure configuration and secrets handling, user disclosure where AI interacts with people, human oversight design, and a tested rollback.
Evidence: the change record, deployment checklist, and published AI disclosures.
5. Operation and monitoring
The longest stage, and the one most programs neglect. The system runs, learns from new inputs, and meets a world that keeps changing.
Risk: model drift, degraded output quality, silent vendor changes, and oversight that decays into a checkbox.
Threats: runtime prompt injection through retrieved content, model extraction, API abuse, and agents acting outside their intended scope.
Control: performance and drift monitoring, agent action logging that shows what was done and on whose behalf, AI incident response, and human reviewers who log what they saw, changed, and why.
Evidence: monitoring dashboards, event logs, incident tickets, and oversight records.
6. Re-evaluation
A deliberate checkpoint: is the system still meeting its objectives, still compliant, and still worth the risk?
Risk: “set and forget” systems that outlive the assumptions they were approved under.
Control: scheduled and event-triggered reviews (after incidents, model updates, new regulations, or a vendor change), refreshed risk and impact assessments, and internal audit.
The system is decommissioned, replaced, or its use is ended.
Risk: zombie endpoints still answering requests, orphaned API keys and agent credentials, and training data or logs kept longer than allowed.
Control: a decommissioning plan covering access revocation, data retention and deletion, model and artifact archival, and stakeholder notice.
Evidence: the retirement record, credential revocation proof, and data disposal confirmation.
The stages form a loop, not a line. Re-evaluation sends a system back to design for changes, forward to operation as-is, or out to retirement.
One lifecycle, three frameworks
The lifecycle is also the cleanest way to see how ISO/IEC 42001, the NIST AI RMF, and the EU AI Act fit together. Each framework expects governance across the whole life of the system, not just at launch.
Stage
ISO/IEC 42001 (Annex A)
NIST AI RMF
EU AI Act (high-risk)
1. Inception
A.5 impact assessment; A.6.1 objectives for responsible AI
Govern, Map
Art. 6 classification; Art. 9 risk management
2. Design and development
A.6.2.2–A.6.2.3 requirements and design; A.7 data; A.10 suppliers
Map, Measure
Art. 10 data governance; Art. 11 technical documentation
3. Verification and validation
A.6.2.4 verification and validation
Measure
Art. 15 accuracy, robustness, cybersecurity
4. Deployment
A.6.2.5 deployment; A.8 information for interested parties
Manage
Art. 13 transparency; Art. 14 human oversight
5. Operation and monitoring
A.6.2.6 operation and monitoring; A.6.2.8 event logs
Clause 9 performance evaluation and internal audit; Clause 10 improvement
Govern, Manage
Art. 9 continuous, iterative risk management
7. Retirement
A.6.2.2 lifecycle requirements; A.7 data retention
Govern, Manage
Art. 18–19 documentation and log retention
The pattern is the point: ISO 42001 gives you the management system, the NIST AI RMF gives you the risk vocabulary, and the EU AI Act tells you which evidence a regulator will ask for. A lifecycle-based AIMS lets one set of controls satisfy all three. Verify clause references against the current texts before an audit.
Where lifecycle governance breaks in practice
When I took ShareVault through ISO 42001 certification on the first audit attempt, inside a financial data room where every control is tested hard, the auditors did not dwell on our policy. They followed systems through their lifecycle and asked for the record at each step.
Three breaks show up in nearly every engagement:
Systems that skip inception. The first discovery sweep almost always finds AI that never went through intake: a vendor feature switched on by default, a browser extension, an agent wired to production with a shared key. You cannot govern a lifecycle that started without you.
Monitoring without evidence. Teams say a human reviews outputs. Ask for proof and you get a checkbox. A checkbox records what the reviewer said they did, not what they saw, changed, or why. Regulators and plaintiffs will ask for the second.
No exit plan. Almost nobody plans retirement. Old endpoints keep answering, credentials keep working, and data outlives its retention period.
The fix is not more policy. It is a lifecycle gate at each stage, with an owner and an artifact. If the artifact does not exist, the control does not either.
Find your weakest stage: free AI Governance Gap Assessment
Before you build lifecycle gates, find out which stages are already leaking. Our free AI Governance Gap Assessment runs in your browser and gives you:
15 questions on how AI is actually governed in your organization today
An instant maturity score
A detailed PDF report you can take to leadership
Your top 3 priority gaps, so you know where to start
Take it with your lifecycle in mind. If your lowest scores sit around inventory and ownership, your problem starts at inception. If they sit around oversight and monitoring, it starts at operation. Either way, you will know which gate to build first.
DISC InfoSec turns lifecycle requirements into operating controls, evidence, and accountable decisions, one expert across AI governance, InfoSec, and regulatory compliance.
DISC InfoSec is a boutique AI governance and cybersecurity consultancy in Petaluma, California, and a PECB Authorized Training Partner. Credentials: AICP, CISSP, CISM, ISO/IEC 42001 and ISO/IEC 27001 Lead Implementer. Contact: info@deurainfosec.com | (707) 998-5164.
Sources
Dejan Kosutic, Advisera: 7 Stages of the AI System Lifecycle for AI Governance (YouTube, Feb 13, 2026). Stage names and the ISO 22989 framing come from this video; the risk, threat, and control mapping is DISC InfoSec’s.
An AI agent got past the login on a government health portal.
Nobody outside the company knew for three months.
In June, an experimental OpenAI research agent was asked to study public medical spending. Along the way it gained unauthorised access to Australia’s Medicare statistics portal. Three Months of Silence: What Australia’s AI Crackdown Means for Your Agents.
OpenAI says it was unintentional. The government was told in September.
On 10 November, Canberra responded: → A new AI safety regulator → Independent evaluations of AI models → Mandatory reporting of “misaligned behaviour” and cyber incidents → Significant penalties, and criminal-law reform under consideration
Read that third line again.
Misaligned behaviour is now reportable. That means an agent pursuing its goal by a route nobody intended. Not just breaches.
Here’s what most security teams miss about this story. The agent wasn’t attacked. No one jailbroke it. It was doing its job, and its job led it past an access control.
That’s the new risk class. Your controls were built to stop people who intend to break in. Agents don’t need intent.
So ask yourself honestly. If one of your agents reached a system it was never meant to touch:
Would you know within a day, or would someone outside tell you?
Does it run under its own identity, or a shared service account?
Is its scope enforced at the network layer, or just in a prompt?
Who decides whether it’s reportable, and by when?
Could you reconstruct exactly what it accessed?
The EU AI Act and California’s SB 53 already have 15-day windows. Australia hasn’t set its number yet. Assume it will be short.
Even if no regulator ever names you, your enterprise customers will. Incident-notice clauses and “what stops your agents going out of scope?” are coming to vendor questionnaires before any statute lands.
I built a free assessment to make this concrete: the Reporting Clock.
30 questions across 7 control domains. About 12 minutes. You get: ✓ A readiness score and tier ✓ Your estimated time from incident to notice, plotted against real reporting windows ✓ Your 5 highest-leverage fixes, mapped to ISO/IEC 42001, NIST AI RMF and the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications
One finding from building it: the “Don’t know” answers are scored as gaps, and they tend to cluster in detection and reporting. That’s the leg of the clock most organisations can’t measure.
If your score surprises you, book a free 20-minute readiness call: calendly.com/hd-deurainfosec | info@deurainfosec.com
The Ship We All Share: Why AI Is a Civilizational Challenge, Not an AI War
Nov 11, 2026 · @disc
A two-week lead on a sinking ship
What good is conquering artificial superintelligence two weeks ahead of your rival if the entire ship sinks?
Watch the latest headlines around Jensen Huang, Silicon Valley boardrooms, and the escalating espionage battles between the US and China. The deeper reality is glaring: our leadership is suffering from profound myopia.
Global powers are treating frontier AI as a zero-sum Cold War. Steal the secrets. Hoard the compute. Race for temporary dominance. But this is not an “AI War.” It is a shared civilizational challenge, and AI governance is how we meet it.
We have made this mistake before
We made the same mistake with COVID-19. Leaders treated a borderless threat as a local issue and waited until the crisis was at their doorstep to react.
AI does not respect national borders. Algorithms do not care about geopolitical flags. A model trained in one country is fine-tuned in a second, deployed in a third, and attacked from a fourth before lunch.
You cannot fence off superintelligence. Stealing intellectual property to secure a fleeting two-week lead changes nothing if the downstream risks threaten humanity as a whole. Misinformation at scale, autonomous cyberattacks, and unsafe models released in a rush do not stop at a customs checkpoint.
What AI can do for all of us
The prize is not a trophy for one nation. Stewarded well, AI is one of the strongest survival tools humanity has ever built.
Health: faster drug discovery, earlier disease detection, and diagnostic support reaching clinics that have never had a specialist.
Pandemic readiness: modeling outbreaks, designing vaccine candidates, and moving supply chains before the next borderless threat arrives.
Climate and food security: better weather and disaster forecasting, grid optimization, and crop resilience for regions under the most stress.
Science: compressing years of research into months, from protein structures to new materials.
Human intelligence: a tutor, translator, and research partner for anyone with a connection, regardless of where they were born.
Security: defenders who detect and contain attacks at machine speed, protecting hospitals, utilities, and the data people trust us with.
None of these benefits respect borders either. A cure discovered in one lab saves lives everywhere. That is the point: the upside is shared, so the stewardship has to be shared too. The question that matters is not how one nation beats another. It is how we, as a global community, steward this power to elevate human intelligence, health, and well-being.
Our myopia about the theft of intelligence
The espionage headlines are about nations stealing chips and model weights. The quieter theft is happening inside our own organizations, every day, and most leaders cannot see it.
Shadow AI: a sales rep’s meeting recorder, a browser extension reading every tab, a free chatbot holding last quarter’s board deck. Confidential data walks out one prompt at a time.
Over-privileged agents: an engineer wires an agent to production with a shared API key. It now holds more access than any human would be granted, and nobody owns it.
Vendor defaults: a SaaS provider switches on an AI feature, and click-through terms allow training on your inputs and your customers’ inputs.
Adversarial attacks: prompt injection, data poisoning, and model extraction (the threats catalogued in MITRE ATLAS and the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications) turn your own AI into the attacker’s tool.
Ask a leadership team how many AI tools their company uses and you get a confident number. Ask how they know, and the room goes quiet. That silence is the same myopia we see at the geopolitical level, scaled down to a single company. You cannot govern AI you cannot see.
Stewardship does not start at the top
Global challenges cannot be solved with tribal mindsets. It is easy to watch world leaders and tech titans and feel powerless. But systemic change never starts from the top down. It starts when individuals, founders, and professionals refuse to accept the current momentum.
In practice, that refusal is called AI governance. It is how a single organization becomes a responsible steward instead of a passive spectator:
See it. Build an inventory of every AI application, agent, and embedded vendor feature, with an accountable owner for each.
Secure it. Scope agent credentials, test for prompt injection, and control what sensitive data reaches which model.
Oversee it. Put a reviewer with authority and context in the loop, and log what they saw, changed, and why. A checkbox is not oversight.
Prove it. Map controls to ISO/IEC 42001, NIST AI RMF, and the EU AI Act, and keep dated, versioned evidence.
When I took ShareVault through ISO 42001 certification on the first audit attempt, the gap was never the policy. Most organizations can write a decent AI policy in a week. The gap is visibility and evidence. Every responsible organization narrows the global risk a little. Every ungoverned one widens it.
Start with what you can see: a free 8-minute assessment
The first act of stewardship is discovery. That is why we built the free AI Governance & Risk Exposure Assessment: 25 questions across six areas (Governance, Security, Compliance, Third-Party Risk, Human Oversight, and Model & Agent Monitoring), scored on a five-level CMMI-style scale.
It answers the seven questions your board, your buyers, and regulators will ask, from “What AI applications and agents are being used?” to “Can we demonstrate compliance?” Each comes back as Blind spot, Partial visibility, or Demonstrable.
Results appear the moment you finish, no sales call required:
An exposure index from 0 to 100 and a radar chart across all six areas
Your top five priority exposures, each with four practitioner-level remediation steps
Every question mapped to ISO/IEC 42001, NIST AI RMF, the EU AI Act, OWASP LLM Top 10, and MITRE ATLAS
A board-ready PDF report
Tip: have security, legal, and engineering take it independently, then compare. Where the answers disagree is usually where the real exposure lives.
When you are ready to move from discovery to action, DISC InfoSec turns AI governance requirements into operating controls, evidence, and accountable decisions. One expert across AI governance, InfoSec, and regulatory compliance: no coordination overhead, no conflicting advice.
DISC InfoSec is a boutique AI governance and cybersecurity consultancy in Petaluma, California, and a PECB Authorized Training Partner. Credentials: AICP, CISSP, CISM, ISO/IEC 42001 and ISO/IEC 27001 Lead Implementer. Contact: info@deurainfosec.com | (707) 998-5164.
The questions only we can answer
When leaders obsess over market share and geopolitical leverage, we risk becoming passive spectators in our own future, waking up only when the consequences are irreversible. So I will leave you with two questions.
How many Jensen Huangs are there leading us? And what is our myopia regarding the theft of intelligence, starting inside our own walls?
Effective AI governance requires more than compliance. It requires verifiable evidence.
Every AI governance program eventually meets the same moment. An auditor, an enterprise buyer, or a regulator stops reading your policy and asks one question: show me.
Show me the AI system register. Show me the risk assessment for the model you shipped last quarter. Show me the human-oversight record for a decision that affected a customer. Show me the incident log, even if it is empty, and prove the process behind it actually runs.
That is the moment where most programs fall apart. Not because the organization is reckless, but because it built governance as a set of documents instead of a system that produces proof.
This post walks the full path: from the ISO/IEC standards ecosystem that defines what good AI governance looks like, through the AI risk and AI security realities that make it urgent, to the audit evidence that makes it verifiable. The core argument is simple. A control that exists but cannot be evidenced is, for audit purposes, a control that does not exist.
Why compliance alone fails
Compliance answers the question “do you have a policy?” Evidence answers the question “does it work?” Buyers and auditors have stopped accepting the first answer.
In our earlier post on the AI oversight gap, the pattern was stark: 58% of organizations felt their AI governance controls were adequate, while only 18% actually had them in place. That 40-point gap is not a security failure. It is an evidence failure. Confidence was built on documents nobody had tested.
Three forces are closing that gap whether organizations are ready or not:
Procurement has a second questionnaire. The security review that once asked about encryption and SOC 2 now asks which AI systems are in scope, who owns model risk, and what happens when a model produces a harmful output.
Regulation demands records, not intentions. The EU AI Act, Colorado’s AI Act, and California’s ADMT rules all hinge on documentation that can be produced on request: risk assessments, impact assessments, logs, and human-oversight records.
AI risk moves faster than annual reviews. Models drift, vendors swap underlying models, and agents gain new tools between audit cycles. A policy signed in January says nothing about the agent connected to production in June.
A paper program fails all three tests for the same reason. An oversight checkbox captures the overseer’s statement, not evidence that oversight happened.
ISO/IEC 42001: the hub that makes governance auditable
ISO/IEC 42001:2023 is the only standard in the AI governance family you can be certified against. That single fact makes it the hub. The surrounding standards are guidance; 42001 is the management system that turns their guidance into requirements an auditor can test.
Published in December 2023, 42001 follows the same Annex SL high-level structure as ISO 27001. Organizations with an ISMS can extend it rather than build a second program. Its mandatory clauses each produce a specific body of evidence:
Clause
What it requires
Evidence an auditor samples
4 Context
Scope and AI system boundary
AIMS scope, AI system register, interested-party register
5 Leadership
Accountable governance
Signed AI policy, RACI, management commitment records
Three elements set 42001 apart from a generic management system. The AI system impact assessment (Clause 6.1.4, Annex A.5) evaluates effects on individuals and society, not just the organization. Intended purpose must be documented for every in-scope system. And the 38 Annex A controls, spanning A.2 through A.10, reach into data quality, human oversight, transparency, and third-party AI suppliers.
The Statement of Applicability is where it all connects. Each control is justified as applicable or excluded, and each applicable control points to an evidence reference. Done well, the SoA becomes a map an auditor can walk from claim to proof.
The supporting standards: what each one proves
Around the 42001 hub sits a family of ISO/IEC standards. None is certifiable on its own, but each one sharpens a part of the AIMS and, used properly, leaves behind a distinct piece of evidence.
Standard
Focus
Where it plugs into 42001
Evidence it should produce
ISO/IEC 38507
Governance of AI by the board and governing bodies
Annex A.6 lifecycle and A.8 information for interested parties
Model cards, explainability notes, robustness and adversarial test results
ISO/IEC TR 24368
Ethical and societal concerns
Clause 6.1.4 AI system impact assessment
Completed AISIAs covering fairness, affected groups, and reversibility of harm
ISO/IEC 5259 series
Data quality for analytics and machine learning
Annex A.7 data for AI systems
Data provenance records, quality metrics, bias testing on training and evaluation data
ISO/IEC 23053 and 22989
ML system framework and AI concepts and terminology
Clause 4 scope and the AI system register
Consistent system descriptions, lifecycle stage definitions, shared vocabulary across policies
Read the last column top to bottom and a pattern appears. Each standard answers “what should good look like?” The AIMS answers “how do we keep doing it?” And the evidence answers “how do we know?”
That third answer is what most implementations underbuild. Organizations adopt the vocabulary of 24028 and the principles of 24368 in policy text, then never generate the test result or the impact assessment that proves the principle was applied to a real system.
AI security and AI threat: where governance meets the attacker
An AI governance program that ignores AI security is governing a system it does not understand. The infographic’s standards define trustworthy AI; attackers define what trustworthy AI has to survive.
LLM applications break the assumption every other security control rests on: that instructions and data are separable. In a language model, data is instructions. That is why the working rule for any AI system is to treat every model output as untrusted input, and every input the model reads as potentially hostile instructions.
The threats that now belong in an AI risk register, mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM and Agentic Applications:
Indirect prompt injection. Instructions hidden in a web page, PDF, email, ticket, or database row that the model retrieves and obeys. The real severity is not the injection; it is the worst action the injection can reach.
Excessive agency and the confused deputy. An agent holding broad credentials acts on behalf of a low-privilege user who can influence its instructions. This is the dominant real-world AI vulnerability.
The lethal trifecta. An agent with access to private data, exposure to untrusted content, and a way to communicate externally can be steered into exfiltration. Break any one leg and the risk becomes manageable.
RAG and memory poisoning. A poisoned document in a vector index is persistent injection. Poisoned agent memory can replay attacker text into future sessions.
MCP and tool supply chain. Tool manifests, OAuth token handling, and egress paths on MCP servers are a new attack surface that most vendor questionnaires do not yet ask about.
Model and data supply chain. Third-party models swapped without notice, poisoned training data, and unvetted fine-tuning sets.
Here is the governance point. A policy line that says “AI systems are protected against prompt injection” is not evidence. These are:
AI threat
Control that actually works
Evidence that proves it
Indirect prompt injection
Capability restriction, isolated sub-agents with no tools for untrusted content
Architecture review record, red-team test results with dates and findings
Confused deputy
Server-side authorization at the tool boundary using the end user’s identity
Tool authorization matrix, access test logs
Data exfiltration via agents
Egress allowlisting, human approval on consequential actions
Egress config snapshots, approval logs with real parameters
RAG cross-tenant leakage
Tenant filters applied in the vector query
Retrieval test cases run per release
MCP server risk
OAuth 2.1 with PKCE, token audience validation, tool manifest integrity
MCP governance standard, manifest hash records, server inventory
Model supply chain change
Supplier AI assessment and change notification clauses (A.10.3)
Supplier review records, contract clauses, model version log
Prompt instructions such as “ignore commands in documents” raise attacker cost but close nothing. An auditor who understands AI security will not accept a design whose only control is a prompt, and neither should you.
Lessons from a first-attempt ISO 42001 certification
DISC InfoSec served as independent internal auditor for a virtual data room platform for M&A and financial services, through ISO 42001 Stage 2 certification on the first attempt with SenSiba as the certifying body. Financial data rooms are the hard mode of compliance. Five lessons from that engagement apply to almost any organization.
The AI system register is the foundation of everything. If an AI feature is not in the register, it is not in the risk assessment, the AISIA, or the SoA. Embedded SaaS AI features and developer tools are the most common omissions.
An empty incident log still needs proof. Auditors want to see the AI incident process run, even when nothing went wrong. Tabletop exercises and near-miss records fill that gap honestly.
Write the standard for the newest risk. VDR MCP Governance Standard existed because agents and tool servers were entering the environment. A later review produced a 27-change redline covering OAuth 2.1 with PKCE, token audience validation, SSRF and egress controls, tool manifest integrity, and confused-deputy protections. Governance that lags the technology fails the first technical question.
Integrate with the ISMS, do not duplicate it. Shared Annex SL structure meant AI incidents ran through existing ISO 27001 incident controls, extended for AI-specific scenarios such as bias, unexpected output, and model drift.
Human oversight must leave a trace. A checkbox records that someone claims to have reviewed an output. A dated review record, with the reviewer, the decision, and any override, records that oversight happened.
A 90-day roadmap to evidence-ready AI governance
Ninety days is enough to move from policy-on-paper to a program that produces its own proof. The sequence matters more than the speed.
Days 1–30: Discover and scope.
Build the AI system register, including SaaS AI features, copilots, agents, and MCP servers.
Define AIMS scope and document intended purpose for each in-scope system.
Run a gap assessment against ISO 42001 Clauses 4–10 and Annex A, with an evidence column, not just a status column.
Days 31–60: Assess and control.
Complete AI risk assessments using ISO/IEC 23894 and AISIAs informed by ISO/IEC TR 24368.
Threat-model each agentic system for the lethal trifecta, prompt injection, and confused-deputy paths.
Draft the Statement of Applicability with an evidence reference for every applicable control.
Assess third-party AI suppliers and add AI-specific contract clauses.
Days 61–90: Prove and improve.
Run the controls and capture the records: oversight reviews, red-team results, retrieval tests, training logs.
Exercise the AI incident process with a tabletop and log it.
Conduct an internal audit and hold a management review with minutes.
Open corrective actions for every nonconformity and track them to closure.
At day 90, the test is not whether the documents exist. It is whether an outsider can pick any control in the SoA and follow it to a dated, owned record in under five minutes.
The ISO/IEC AI standards give organizations a shared definition of responsible, secure, and trustworthy AI. ISO/IEC 42001 turns that definition into a system. But neither the standards nor the certificate is the point. The point is the evidence trail that lets a buyer, an auditor, or a regulator verify your claims without taking your word for them.
Organizations that build for evidence get three things the paper programs do not: faster enterprise deals, cleaner audits, and an honest view of their own AI risk before an attacker or a regulator finds it first.
Find out where your evidence gaps are. DISC InfoSec helps B2B SaaS and financial services firms move from AI governance policy to audit-ready proof, from ISO 42001 gap assessments and AI risk and threat reviews to full AIMS implementation and vCAIO advisory.
Take the free AI Governance Maturity Calculator for a 5-level maturity score in about 10 minutes.
“DiscInfoSec” Deura is Principal Consultant at DISC InfoSec, holding CISSP, CISM, ISO/IEC 42001 Lead Implementer, and ISO/IEC 27001 Lead Implementer credentials.
Your AI is already in production. The only question is whether you can prove it is governed. The free DISC InfoSec AI Governance Scorecard answers that in eight questions and a few minutes, with a maturity score, a PDF report, and your top three gaps.
The question nobody wants to answer on the spot
An enterprise buyer sends a security questionnaire with a new AI section. A board member asks what the company’s AI risk is. A regulator’s deadline lands on the calendar: the Colorado AI Act takes effect January 1, 2027, and EU AI Act obligations are already phasing in.
In each case the honest answer is usually “we think we’re fine.” That is an opinion, not a position. And opinions do not close deals, satisfy auditors, or hold up after an incident.
Most teams are not short on effort. They have an acceptable use policy, a few approved tools, maybe a vendor review. What they lack is a fast, structured way to see where all of that actually stands.
Why a score beats an opinion
AI governance used to be a policy exercise. In 2026 it sits where four disciplines meet, and a gap in any one shows up in the others.
AI risk. Biased, opaque, or unreliable outputs become business decisions nobody can explain afterward.
AI threats. Prompt injection, data exfiltration through prompts and uploads, and agents with more access than any human would get.
AI security. Shared API keys, unvetted plugins and MCP servers, and no logs of what an agent did or on whose behalf.
AI governance. No inventory, no named owners, no risk register, and oversight that exists as a checkbox rather than a record.
A maturity score turns that sprawl into one number you can track, discuss, and improve. It also gives security, legal, and engineering a shared vocabulary, which is usually the first thing missing.
Meet the free AI Governance Scorecard
The AI Governance Scorecard is a browser-based self-assessment built by DISC InfoSec. It is free, needs no install, and runs in Chrome, Edge, Firefox, or Safari.
What
Detail
Length
8 questions, a few minutes
Scoring
Each answer rated on a five-level maturity scale, 1 to 5
Output
Instant maturity score on screen
Report
Detailed, downloadable PDF
Priorities
Your top 3 governance gaps, ranked
Cost
Free
Eight questions is deliberate. It is short enough to finish between meetings, yet long enough to separate a team that has written a policy from one that can show the policy working.
How to use it
Open the Scorecard at this link in any modern browser.
Enter your details: name, business email, company, job title, and company size. This tailors the report and lets us follow up only if you ask.
Answer all eight questions on the 1 to 5 scale. Pick the level that describes how things work today, not how the policy says they should.
Click Generate My Scorecard. Your maturity score appears immediately.
Download the PDF and review your top three gaps.
Book a free 30-minute results review at calendly.com/hd-deurainfosec if you want help turning the gaps into a plan.
Tips for a score you can trust
Score the evidence, not the intent. If you could not show an auditor a dated record tomorrow, score it lower.
Count the AI you did not buy on purpose. Copilots switched on by a SaaS vendor, meeting recorders, browser extensions, and agents an engineer wired up all count.
Run it as a team exercise. Have security, legal, and engineering each complete it, then compare. Where the scores disagree is usually where the real exposure lives.
Retake it quarterly. The trend matters more than any single score.
What you get out of it
A baseline in minutes, not a quarter. One maturity score gives you a starting point to measure every improvement against.
A board-ready answer. The PDF turns “what’s our AI risk?” from a guess into a documented position you can put in a slide.
Priorities, not a wall of findings. Three ranked gaps tell you where the next 30 days of effort pay off most.
Faster security questionnaires. Knowing your weak spots before a buyer asks keeps AI questions from stalling deals.
A head start on frameworks. The gaps that drag your score down are the same ones ISO/IEC 42001, NIST AI RMF, the EU AI Act, and the Colorado AI Act all expect you to close.
Internal alignment. A shared score ends the debate about whether governance is “good enough” and starts one about what to fix.
Who it’s for: CISOs, CIOs, CTOs, compliance and risk leads, and founders at B2B SaaS and financial services firms. It is most useful when a customer questionnaire just landed, the board is asking, agents are going live, or you are weighing ISO 42001 certification.
Reading your score
Level 3 is the line that matters. It is roughly what enterprise buyers and auditors expect to see evidenced, so anything below it is a gap someone outside your company will eventually find.
Level
What it usually looks like
Your next move
1
AI use is ad hoc; no inventory, owner, or policy anyone follows
Discovery first: find what is running and who owns it
2
A policy exists, but enforcement and evidence are thin
Build the risk register and assign accountable owners
3
Defined processes, documented controls, some records
Close the top three gaps and test the evidence
4
Controls are measured and monitored
Prepare for ISO 42001 certification
5
Governance improves continuously from metrics and incidents
Sustain it with periodic internal audit
Whatever your level, the three priority gaps in your report are the place to start.
From score to a defensible program
A score shows where you stand. DISC InfoSec helps you move, with services sized to whichever level you landed on. Full details are on our AIMS, ISO 42001 and AI Governance page.
Service
Best for
What you get
Free 30-minute results review
Anyone who took the Scorecard
Your gaps explained, noise separated from real exposure, and the shortest path forward
AI and agent discovery, shadow AI and data exposure review, a risk register with named owners, and a remediation roadmap in 7–10 days
AI Governance Readiness Assessment
Teams preparing for the EU AI Act or Colorado AI Act
A 10-day, fixed-fee review of AI compliance, risk posture, and governance readiness
ISO 42001 Control Gap Assessment
Levels 2–3 weighing certification
A 2-week gap assessment against ISO 42001 with a prioritized remediation roadmap
Baseline AIMS services
Teams that need the foundations fast
AI risk register setup (1-day engagement) and an ISO 42001-aligned AI Policy & Procedure Starter Kit
ISO 42001 implementation
Levels 3–4 heading to audit
A full AI management system that produces audit evidence, not just documents
vCAIO and vCISO retainers
Any level, ongoing
Fractional AI governance and security leadership without a full-time hire
We also map AI governance onto what you already run. If you hold ISO 27001, SOC 2, or follow NIST CSF, we extend those controls to AI rather than building a parallel program.
My perspective
I took a virtual data room provider, through ISO 42001 certification on the first audit attempt. Financial data rooms are the hard mode of compliance: every control gets tested, and every claim needs a record behind it.
The lesson I keep coming back to is that the gap is rarely the policy. Most organizations can write a decent AI policy in a week. The gap is evidence. When I ask for proof of human oversight, I usually get a checkbox, and a checkbox captures what the reviewer said they did, not what they saw, changed, or why.
That is why the Scorecard asks how things work today. If you score well, certification may be a short step. If you don’t, you have just learned where to start, before a customer, an auditor, or an incident shows you.
DISC InfoSec is a boutique AI governance and cybersecurity consultancy in Petaluma, California, and a PECB Authorized Training Partner. Credentials include CISSP, CISM, AICP, ISO/IEC 42001 Lead Implementer, and ISO/IEC 27001 Lead Implementer.
You Can’t Govern AI You Can’t See: The Free AI Governance & Risk Exposure Assessment
Nov 5, 2026 · @disc
Ask a leadership team how many AI tools their company uses and you’ll get a confident number. Ask how they know, and the room goes quiet.
That silence is the real AI risk. It isn’t the model you approved last quarter. It’s the meeting recorder a sales rep installed, the copilot your CRM vendor switched on by default, and the agent an engineer wired to production with a shared API key. None of them are in a register. None of them have an owner. And all of them are touching data you’re contractually obligated to protect.
That’s why we built the AI Governance & Risk Exposure Assessment: a free, 8-minute self-assessment that shows where your AI exposure actually sits, before a customer questionnaire, an auditor, or an incident shows you first.
Stop asking whether you need ISO 42001
Most AI governance conversations start in the wrong place: “Do we need ISO 42001?” or “Does the EU AI Act apply to us?” Those are good questions. They’re just not the first ones.
You can’t pick a framework for risks you haven’t found. A certification scoped around three sanctioned tools means little if forty unsanctioned ones are processing customer data. And a policy nobody can enforce is a document, not a control.
The first job is discovery. What’s running, what it touches, who owns it, and what you could prove tomorrow. Frameworks come after you know what you’re governing. This assessment is built to do that first job.
Seven questions your board and your buyers will ask
Every enterprise security questionnaire, board briefing, and regulatory inquiry about AI eventually reduces to seven questions. The assessment is designed to tell you which ones you can answer with evidence today.
What AI applications and agents are being used? Including AI features inside SaaS tools you already pay for, and agents acting on someone’s behalf.
Are employees using unauthorized AI tools? Shadow AI is where most confidential data quietly leaves the building.
Is sensitive or confidential data exposed to AI systems? Prompts, uploads, and retrieval pipelines that ignore the source system’s permissions.
Are AI vendors and third-party models being assessed? Click-through terms often allow training on your inputs, and on your customers’ inputs.
Are AI systems subject to appropriate human oversight? Not a checkbox. A reviewer with authority, context, and a logged decision.
Are AI risks documented and assigned to accountable owners? Unowned risk is unmanaged risk.
Can the organization demonstrate compliance with applicable AI requirements? “We have a policy” is not evidence. A dated, versioned record is.
When you finish, each question comes back marked Blind spot, Partial visibility, or Demonstrable, along with the specific control dragging it down.
How it works
The assessment asks 25 questions across six areas. Each answer is a concrete description of how things work in your organization today, scored on a five-level CMMI-style scale from L1 Initial to L5 Optimizing.
Area
Questions
What it uncovers
Governance
5
AI inventory, policy, accountable owners, risk register, impact assessment
Security
4
Shadow AI, sensitive data exposure, prompt injection testing, agent permissions
Compliance
4
Regulatory applicability, audit-ready evidence, AI disclosure, internal audit
Third-Party Risk
4
Vendor due diligence, AI contract terms, embedded SaaS AI, foundation model risk
Human Oversight
4
Human review, stop and override, evidence of oversight, AI literacy
Model & Agent Monitoring
4
Drift, agent action logging, AI incident response, output quality
Every question shows the controls it maps to, so your team learns the frameworks as they answer:
ISO/IEC 42001:2023 clauses and Annex A controls, such as A.4.2 for resource documentation and A.10.3 for suppliers
NIST AI RMF 1.0 subcategories across Govern, Map, Measure, and Manage
EU AI Act articles, including Art. 4 (AI literacy), Art. 14 (human oversight), and Art. 50 (transparency)
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications and MITRE ATLAS where the risk is adversarial, such as prompt injection and excessive agency
The questions are written for 2026 realities, not 2023 ones. They ask whether your agents have scoped credentials and tool allowlists, whether MCP servers are vetted before use, whether you know when a SaaS vendor switches on a new AI feature, and whether you can reconstruct exactly what an agent did and on whose behalf.
What you walk away with
Results appear the moment you finish. No sales call required to see them.
An exposure index from 0 to 100, with an exposure tier and an overall maturity level. The tier is tied to the maturity level, so the headline never contradicts the detail.
A radar chart of all six areas, with a dashed ring marking L3 Defined. That’s the minimum most enterprise buyers and auditors expect to see evidenced, and it shows at a glance which areas fall inside it.
The seven questions, answered. Each one marked as a blind spot, partial visibility, or demonstrable, with the weakest underlying control named.
Your top five priority exposures. Ranked by distance from the L3 baseline and weighted by how often each gap drives incidents, regulatory findings, or stalled deals. Each comes with four specific remediation steps, a typical effort estimate, and its framework references.
An area-by-area readout of what your scores mean in practice.
A board-ready PDF report, with a cover summary, the radar, priorities, and a full appendix of your answers mapped to ISO 42001, NIST AI RMF, and the EU AI Act.
The remediation steps are practitioner-level, not generic. “Pull 90 days of SSO, expense, and DNS logs to identify AI tools in use.” “Give every agent its own identity and short-lived, scoped credentials.” “Log what the reviewer saw, what they changed, and why.” Things your team can start on Monday.
Who should take it, and when
The assessment is built for CISOs, CIOs, CTOs, compliance leads, and founders at B2B SaaS and financial services firms. It’s most useful at moments like these:
An enterprise customer just sent an AI security questionnaire and the deal clock is running.
The board asked “what’s our AI risk?” and you need a defensible answer, not a guess.
You’re deploying AI agents and want to know what could go wrong before it does.
You suspect shadow AI or data leakage but can’t measure it.
You’re weighing ISO 42001 certification and want to know how far away you actually are.
EU AI Act transparency duties are already in effect and you’re not sure what applies to you.
It also works as a team exercise. Have security, legal, and engineering answer independently, then compare. Where the answers disagree is usually where the real exposure lives.
My perspective
I’ve taken a client through ISO 42001 certification on the first audit attempt, in a financial data room environment where every control gets tested hard. The lesson I keep coming back to is that the gap is almost never the policy. Most organizations can write a decent AI policy in a week. The gap is visibility and evidence.
In nearly every engagement, the first discovery sweep turns up AI the leadership team didn’t know about. A vendor feature enabled by default. A browser extension with access to every tab. An agent with more access than any human would be granted. And when I ask for evidence of human oversight, I usually get a checkbox. A checkbox captures what the reviewer said they did. It doesn’t show what they saw, what they changed, or why. Regulators and plaintiffs will ask for the second.
That’s why I built this assessment around discovery rather than a framework pitch. If you can answer all seven questions with evidence, you’re in better shape than most, and certification is a short step. If you can’t, you’ve just learned where to start, and that’s worth more than any certificate scoped around the AI you already knew about.
Find your blind spots in 8 minutes
Take the free AI Governance & Risk Exposure Assessment
Want help reading the results? Book a 30-minute results review. We’ll walk through your scores, separate real exposures from questionnaire noise, and outline the shortest path to AI governance you can demonstrate. For teams ready to move, the DISC InfoSec AI Governance Quick-Start delivers AI and agent discovery, a shadow AI and data exposure review, a risk register with named owners, and a remediation roadmap in 7–10 days.
DISC InfoSec is a boutique AI governance and cybersecurity consultancy in Petaluma, California, and a PECB Authorized Training Partner. Our team holds AICP, CISSP, CISM, ISO/IEC 42001 Lead Implementer, and ISO/IEC 27001 Lead Implementer credentials. Contact: info@deurainfosec.com | (707) 998-5164.
Here’s a question I’m hearing more often in enterprise security reviews:
“Show us how you manage AI model risk.”
Plenty of teams with a clean ISO 27001 certificate go quiet at that point. They have their 93 Annex A controls covering access, encryption, logging and supplier security. All of it is solid, and none of it was written for systems that learn, drift, hallucinate, or make decisions about people.
That’s the gap ISO/IEC 42001 was built to close.
The overlap between the two standards is real. Both share the same management-system backbone, so your ISMS gives you a head start. But 42001 adds requirements your current program almost certainly doesn’t address:
AI system impact assessments. These look at effects on individuals and society, not just on your organization.
Data governance for AI. This covers provenance, quality, labeling, and how training data is handled.
Lifecycle controls. These run from design and validation through monitoring for drift and retirement.
Transparency and human oversight. These cover who can explain a decision, and who can override it.
Third-party AI. This means knowing which vendors, APIs and embedded copilots are making decisions inside your stack.
The pressure is no longer theoretical. Enterprise questionnaires now include AI sections, auditors are asking AI-specific questions, and the EU AI Act’s obligations are phasing in. If you’re in B2B SaaS or financial services, your customers will ask before your auditor does.
I’ve walked an organization through ISO 42001 Stage 2 certification on the first attempt. The biggest lesson was that teams who build on their existing ISMS move far faster than teams who treat AI governance as a separate project.
I put together a side-by-side ISO 27001 vs ISO 42001 comparison guide that maps where the gaps are. Comment “GUIDE” or DM me and I’ll send it over.
Or grab 30 minutes and we’ll look at your program together: calendly.com/hd-deurainfosec
The Rise of LLMJacking: How Threat Actors Monetize Compromised Cloud and Model Resources
Nov 3, 2026 · @disc
The $100,000 Afternoon
Cryptojacking took months to show up on a cloud bill. LLMJacking takes an afternoon. In incidents Mandiant worked through 2026, attackers ran up more than $100,000 in fraudulent model charges in a single day, and some victims hit roughly $1 million before anyone revoked the stolen access.
That is the headline from the Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant report published November 2, 2026. The attackers did not need a zero-day or a jailbreak. They needed one leaked service account key, one GitHub token, or one LLM API key committed to a public repo.
Here is the uncomfortable part for anyone selling or buying AI-enabled software. Every organization that has wired a frontier model into production now holds a credential that converts directly into cash. Criminals have noticed. They have built a supply chain to steal those credentials, validate them quietly, and resell the model access to paying subscribers at a discount, while the victim pays the invoice.
For B2B SaaS and financial services teams, this is not only a cloud security story. It is a denial-of-wallet risk, a data exposure risk, and an AI governance evidence problem. Your ISO/IEC 42001 auditor, your SOC 2 auditor, and your enterprise customers’ vendor risk teams will start asking how you govern model access. This post lays out how LLMJacking works, who profits, and the specific controls and evidence that close the gap.
What Mandiant and GTIG Actually Found
LLMJacking is now an organized, multi-region criminal business with a division of labor, not a hobbyist’s trick. The November 2026 report draws on multiple Mandiant incident responses across North America, South America, and Asia Pacific, hitting financial services, retail, technology, and transportation organizations.
Five findings matter most for defenders:
Speed beats cryptojacking. Cryptominers drain resources slowly. LLMJacking produces billing spikes within hours, with single-day fraud above $100,000 and cumulative losses near $1 million at some victims.
Identity is the front door. Exposed endpoints such as unauthenticated Ollama servers get probed, but the dominant entry point was stolen cloud identity: IAM credentials, service account keys, GitHub personal access tokens, and live session tokens.
Attackers turn LLM services on. In several cases the victim had never enabled a managed LLM service. The attacker enabled Bedrock, Gemini, or similar APIs with stolen keys, then started billing.
The model gateway is a target. A follow-on actor exploited CVE-2026-40217, a user ID rebind flaw in the LiteLLM /key/regenerate endpoint, to turn ordinary virtual keys into PROXY_ADMIN master credentials.
Specialists now split the work. One cluster breaks in and validates access. A second cluster runs “LLM Mixers” that pool, meter, and resell the stolen model access to underground subscribers.
The tradecraft is quiet before it is loud. One group validated keys harvested from public GitHub with single-token requests (max_tokens=1), cheap enough to slip under volume-based SIEM and EDR thresholds. Another bypassed MFA by tricking users into pasting a raw JSON access token into a fake portal for joining an LLM user group, a tactic GTIG attributes to UNC6993.
The LLMJacking Kill Chain
Every stage of an LLMJacking intrusion uses ordinary cloud attack techniques; only the payoff is new. That is good news. Most of the controls you need already exist in your cloud security program. They just are not pointed at model services yet.
Stage
What attackers did in the Mandiant cases
MITRE ATT&CK / ATLAS
Earliest place to catch it
1. Credential theft
Harvested LLM API keys and service account keys from public GitHub; stole PATs; phished raw session tokens
The table shows where defenders have leverage. Stages 1 and 2 are cheap to stop and nearly invisible to traditional volume-based alerting. By stage 7 you are watching an invoice grow in real time.
The LLM Mixer Economy: Your Quota, Their Storefront
Stolen model access is now a resold commodity, and your invoice funds someone else’s discount subscription. GTIG calls the resale layer “LLM Mixers”: gateways that proxy, pool, and meter unauthorized access, then sell it to underground customers.
The tooling is mostly open source, which makes the economics brutal:
Pooling and load balancing. UNC6993 used new-api, a centralized model hub, and gcli2api, which turns CLI tools into standard model endpoints, to aggregate stolen keys and spread requests across victim accounts.
Retail storefronts. The service Jet Night, run on stolen third-party keys, executed more than 500,000 API calls in under eight hours and passed close to $1 million in token costs to one victim. Its unlimited plan sold for about $60 a month, against $100 to $250 for a comparable legitimate tier. Its public Telegram channel announced outages, which GTIG reads as keys being revoked by victims.
Lookalike relays. One actor ran custom ai-relay infrastructure on a domain built to mimic the victim’s own internal host, siphoning quota into the newapi.pro resale ecosystem.
Hijacked agents and GPUs. Another actor deployed public reverse proxies branded D1337-KAIROS, a containerized Manus-based agent backdoor that reasoned through tasks and ran commands locally, self-hosted LiteLLM gateways, and GPU instances across regions with quota-increase requests.
The lesson for governance teams: stolen model access has a market price, a resale channel, and customer demand. That turns every unscoped API key into a monetizable asset, the same way stolen card numbers became one twenty years ago. Expect LLMJacking to keep displacing cryptojacking, because the margins are better and the payout is immediate.
Network indicators GTIG published: jet-night.com and newapi.pro, both classified as LLM Mixers. Block them at egress and hunt for historical connections.
Why This Is an AI Governance Problem, Not Just a Cloud Ticket
LLMJacking succeeds where AI governance stops at the policy document. The attackers did not beat a model; they walked through gaps in inventory, ownership, spend limits, and logging that an AI management system is supposed to close.
Five governance failures show up across the Mandiant cases:
No inventory of model access. If you cannot list which identities can call which models, you cannot notice a new one. GTIG explicitly recommends shadow LLM discovery, which is the AI system inventory ISO/IEC 42001 already expects.
Model services that were never approved got switched on. Several victims had no LLM service enabled until the attacker enabled it. That is a change-management and approval failure, not just an IAM gap.
Denial-of-wallet was never a named risk. OWASP lists Unbounded Consumption (LLM10:2025) in its Top 10 for LLM applications. Most risk registers still treat AI cost as a FinOps topic, with no owner, no threshold, and no incident trigger.
The model gateway is treated as plumbing. LiteLLM-style routers hold master keys for every model you pay for. That makes the gateway a crown-jewel asset that needs patch SLAs, admin-key monitoring, and its own threat model.
Agents inherit ambient credentials. The D1337-KAIROS backdoor shows attackers running their own agent inside your cloud on your bill. Any agentic workload with broad service account rights, model access, and open egress closes the “lethal trifecta” of private data, untrusted input, and an outbound channel.
There is also a data protection angle that gets lost in the billing headlines. The same footholds were used to clone repositories, query data warehouse metadata for passwords, and pull secrets from cloud secret managers. Prompts and completions routed through a hijacked gateway can expose customer data. For financial services firms, that can become a reportable incident, not just an unexpected invoice.
This connects to a theme from earlier DISC InfoSec posts, The Controls Are Still Being Written and The Harness Is the Contract: AI capability is shipping faster than the controls and evidence around it. LLMJacking is what that gap looks like once criminals put a price on it.
Threat Model: Risk, Mapping, Control, Evidence
Each LLMJacking risk needs a named control and a piece of evidence an auditor or customer can check. A control without evidence is a statement, not assurance, which is the same point we made in the When Structure Pays case study with Frontier Founder.
Risk
OWASP mapping
Control
Evidence an auditor can verify
Long-lived cloud or LLM keys leak to code, CI, or chat
LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure; ASI03 Identity & Privilege Abuse
Workload identity federation instead of static keys; secret scanning with push protection; 90-day max key age
Scanner reports; key-age report from IAM credential report; zero static keys for prod model access
Compromised model or dependency pulled into pipelines
LLM03 Supply Chain; ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain
Approved internal model registry; SCA on ML dependencies
Registry allowlist; SCA results in CI
Detection and Hunting Playbook
Treat any unauthorized enablement of an LLM service, or any change to model invocation logging, as a critical security event. Those two signals arrive before the bill does. Volume alerts alone will miss the max_tokens=1 validation sweeps that come first.
AWS (Bedrock, via CloudTrail)
Abuse: InvokeModel, InvokeModelWithResponseStream, Converse from principals or regions with no history.
Spraying: spikes in ThrottlingException, ValidationException, ResourceNotFoundException.
Scoping: ListFoundationModels, ListInferenceProfiles, GetFoundationModelAvailability; unlock attempts via PutUseCaseForModelAccess and CreateFoundationModelAgreement.
Evasion: GetModelInvocationLoggingConfiguration, PutModelInvocationLoggingConfiguration, DeleteModelInvocationLoggingConfiguration by non-IaC principals.
Tooling: user agents such as aws-sdk-rust, aws-sdk-go-v2, or CLI tools that your workloads never use.
Azure (Microsoft.CognitiveServices)
Abuse: high volumes of POST requests to Completions or Chat Completions endpoints. This needs Diagnostic Logs enabled on the data plane.
New capacity: Microsoft.CognitiveServices/accounts/deployments/write.
Scoping: accounts/read and accounts/deployments/read by unusual identities.
Evasion: Microsoft.Insights/diagnosticSettings/read, write, or delete.
Google Cloud (aiplatform.googleapis.com)
Enablement: alert on ServiceUsage.EnableService for the agent platform.
Abuse: PredictionService.Predict, GenerateContent, StreamGenerateContent. These live in Data Access audit logs, which are off by default, so turn them on for model projects.
Evasion: IAMPolicy.GetIamPolicy and log sink reads (ListSinks, GetSink) from unexpected principals.
At the model gateway (LiteLLM, Portkey, Kong AI, custom)
Requests with max_tokens of 1 to 5 or zero temperature from new source IPs or keys.
New virtual keys, key regeneration, or admin role changes, especially via /key/regenerate.
Per-key token rate that jumps more than 10x over its 7-day baseline.
Egress to known mixer infrastructure such as jet-night.com and newapi.pro, or to lookalike domains of your own hosts.
Cross-cutting identity hunts
New IAM users or service accounts with names that sound like billing or optimization tools.
Project-wide SSH keys added to instance metadata; startup script changes.
Service account key creation, or token creation for high-privilege service accounts.
Quota increase requests for GPU families you do not run.
If you run Google Security Operations, GTIG maps this activity to existing rules such as GCP Service Account Key Creation, GCE Project SSH Keys, AWS Create New Access Key, and Persistence via instance metadata startup scripts. Other SIEMs can implement the same logic as Sigma or KQL rules.
Hardening: Twelve Controls, Ranked by Payoff
If you do only three things this month, kill static model keys, cap spend per key, and block unapproved LLM service enablement. Those three break the attacker’s business model even when a credential leaks. The rest of the list hardens around them.
Tier 1: stop the bleeding (this week)
Hard spend caps and per-model quotas. Set budgets per project and per gateway key, with alerts routed to security, not only finance. A cap turns a $1 million incident into a $5,000 one.
Deny-by-default for LLM services. Use AWS SCPs, GCP Organization Policies, or Azure Policy to block enabling Bedrock, the agent platform, or Azure OpenAI outside approved projects. Block model access agreements the same way.
Rotate and scope every model key. Inventory LLM API keys, revoke unused ones, and scope the rest by model, environment, and rate. A key for a cheap utility model should never reach a frontier model.
Tier 2: close the doors (this month)
Replace static cloud keys with workload identity. Service account keys and long-lived access keys were the dominant entry point. Federation removes the thing to steal.
Secret scanning with push protection across GitHub, GitLab, CI logs, container images, and frontend bundles. Rotate first, then rewrite history.
Phishing-resistant MFA and short-lived sessions for consoles, IdPs, and developer platforms, plus training on token-paste lures.
Turn on model invocation and data access logging in every model project, and alert on any change to it.
Tier 3: harden the AI layer (this quarter)
Treat the model gateway as a crown jewel. Put LiteLLM or equivalent in the asset register, patch CVE-2026-40217 now, store master keys in a vault, and alert on admin key creation.
Egress allowlisting for model workloads and agent runtimes, plus blocks on known mixer domains.
Sandbox agents. Run code-executing agents in isolated, process-level sandboxes with no ambient admin identity.
Approved model and dependency registry. Pull models only from vetted internal sources; run SCA on ML libraries.
Continuous exposure testing. Scan for open Ollama, vLLM, or gateway endpoints and simulate a validation sweep against your own keys to prove alerts fire.
Governance Crosswalk: Where LLMJacking Controls Live in Your Frameworks
You do not need a new framework for LLMJacking; you need existing controls scoped to model access. The crosswalk below shows where each control family already sits, so one piece of evidence can serve several audits.
Control family
ISO/IEC 42001
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A
NIST AI RMF 1.0
NIST CSF 2.0
SOC 2 (TSC 2017)
Inventory of models, keys, gateways
A.4.2 resource documentation; A.4.5 system and computing resources
5.9 inventory of assets
GOVERN 1.6
ID.AM
CC6.1
Identity, keys, and MFA
A.4.5; Clause 6.1 risk treatment
5.15, 5.17, 8.2, 8.5
MANAGE 2.4
PR.AA
CC6.1, CC6.2
Approval to enable new models or services
A.6.2.2 to A.6.2.5 lifecycle requirements and deployment
8.9 configuration; 8.32 change management
MAP 1.1; GOVERN 1.4
PR.PS-01
CC8.1
Spend caps and quotas (denial-of-wallet)
A.6.2.6 operation and monitoring
8.6 capacity management
MEASURE 2.7; MANAGE 2.3
PR.IR-04
A1.1
Invocation logging and alerting
A.6.2.8 event logs
8.15 logging; 8.16 monitoring
MEASURE 2.7; MANAGE 4.1
DE.CM
CC7.2
Gateway and ML supply chain patching
A.10 third-party and customer relationships
5.19 to 5.23 supplier and cloud services; 8.8 vulnerabilities
MAP 4.1; GOVERN 6.1
GV.SC; ID.RA
CC7.1, CC9.2
AI incident response
Clause 10 improvement; A.8 information for interested parties
5.24 to 5.28 incident management
MANAGE 4.3
RS.MA
CC7.3 to CC7.5
Two regulatory notes. First, under the EU AI Act, Article 15 requires high-risk AI systems to be resilient against attempts by unauthorized third parties to exploit vulnerabilities, which squarely covers credential and gateway abuse. Second, for U.S. financial institutions, an LLMJacking intrusion that touches customer data can trigger GLBA Safeguards Rule and state notification duties, so loop counsel in early.
Verify control numbers against the current version of each standard before citing them in an audit response; numbering shifts between editions.
Incident Response: The First 60 Minutes and the First 24 Hours
In an LLMJacking incident, every hour of hesitation is billed. Containment comes first, forensics second, because the attacker’s meter is running on your account.
First 60 minutes: stop the spend
Apply a hard budget cap or quota of zero on the affected model services and gateway keys.
Revoke the suspect LLM API keys and gateway virtual keys. Rotate first where production depends on them.
Disable, do not delete, suspect IAM users, service accounts, and keys. Keep them for evidence.
Block egress to known mixer domains and to any lookalike domains you find in gateway logs.
Snapshot current IAM policy, logging configuration, and gateway config before anyone changes more.
Open a case with your cloud provider’s support and abuse teams about the fraudulent charges.
First 24 hours: evict and scope
Hunt for persistence: new identities, admin policy attachments, project-wide SSH keys, startup scripts, and GPU instances in unused regions.
Find the entry point: leaked keys in Git history, CI logs, container images, or phished session tokens.
Scope data exposure: cloned repositories, secret manager reads, data warehouse queries, and prompts or outputs routed through the gateway.
Re-enable logging that was altered, and confirm data access logs cover every model project.
Brief legal and compliance on notification duties, customer contracts, and cyber insurance terms.
Record everything in your AI incident log; ISO/IEC 42001 and SOC 2 auditors will ask for it.
Afterward, run a short post-incident review that ends in specific control changes, owners, and dates, not just a lessons-learned paragraph.
My Perspective
LLMJacking is the clearest proof yet that AI risk is measured in dollars before it is measured in headlines. The industry has spent two years debating jailbreaks and hallucinations. Meanwhile, criminals found the simplest exploit of all: use someone else’s credentials, run someone else’s models, and send someone else the bill.
When I led ShareVault through ISO/IEC 42001 Stage 2 certification, and later wrote its MCP Governance Standard, the controls that held up under audit were never the clever ones. They were inventory, ownership, least privilege, logging, and evidence that those things worked. LLMJacking attacks exactly those basics. Financial data rooms are the hard mode of compliance for a reason: when the asset is money or customer data, the attacker shows up with a business plan.
Three things I would tell any CISO or founder this week:
Put AI spend on the risk register with a security owner. Denial-of-wallet is a security outcome, and a hard spending cap is the cheapest control you will ever deploy.
Count your model gateway as a crown jewel. If it holds master keys to every model you pay for, it deserves the same patching and monitoring as your identity provider.
Ask for evidence, not policy. Can you show an auditor the list of identities that can invoke a frontier model, and an alert that fired in testing? If not, you have a statement, not a control.
The good news is that nothing in the Mandiant report requires exotic tooling. It requires governance that reaches the model layer, which is exactly what ISO/IEC 42001 and the NIST AI RMF were built to do.
Work With DISC InfoSec
If you cannot answer “who can invoke our models, and what stops a $100,000 day?” in under a minute, let’s fix that. DISC InfoSec helps B2B SaaS and financial services teams put AI governance where attackers are actually operating.
Free AI Governance Readiness Assessment: a 30-minute review of your model inventory, key hygiene, spend controls, and logging.
AI Governance Quick-Start (7 to 10 days): an LLMJacking-focused control baseline mapped to ISO/IEC 42001, ISO/IEC 27001, and the NIST AI RMF, with evidence your auditors and customers will accept.
vCISO / vCAIO retainers: ongoing ownership of AI risk, model gateway governance, and audit readiness.
“DiscInfoSec” Deura, CISSP, CISM, ISO/IEC 42001 Lead Implementer, ISO/IEC 27001 Lead Implementer. Principal Consultant, DISC InfoSec. Led ShareVault to ISO/IEC 42001 certification on the first Stage 2 audit.
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025) and OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (2026).
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise (Cloud) and MITRE ATLAS.
ISO/IEC 42001:2023, ISO/IEC 27001:2022, NIST AI RMF 1.0, NIST CSF 2.0, EU AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689).
Publishing Notes
Title: LLMJacking: How Attackers Monetize Stolen Cloud AI Access
Meta description: LLMJacking drove $100K-a-day fraud in 2026. Learn the kill chain, LLM Mixer economy, detection queries, and ISO 42001 controls that stop denial-of-wallet.
Slug: /llmjacking-stolen-cloud-ai-access
Keywords: LLMJacking, LLM API key security, denial-of-wallet, AI governance, ISO 42001, model gateway security, LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217, Bedrock security
LinkedIn post: Mandiant just documented attackers running up $100,000 a day in AI bills on stolen cloud credentials. Some victims hit $1M before anyone noticed. They didn’t jailbreak anything. They used leaked keys, quietly tested them with one-token requests, switched on model services the victim never used, and resold the access through “LLM Mixers” for $60 a month. Three controls break this business model: no static model keys, hard spend caps per key, and deny-by-default for new LLM services. Full kill chain, detection queries for AWS, Azure, and GCP, and an ISO 42001 crosswalk in the post. #AIGovernance #AISecurity #ISO42001 #CloudSecurity #LLMJacking
AI Agent Harness Security: The Hidden Layer of AI Risk (2026)
The model proposes; the harness disposes. Why the software layer around your LLM is where agentic AI risk lives, and how to secure and govern it under OWASP ASI, ISO 42001 and NIST AI RMF.
Every agentic AI conversation in a boardroom starts with the model. Which one, how smart, how safe, how expensive. That is the wrong place to start.
In September 2026 the Australian Signals Directorate published Agentic AI Harnesses: The layer above the model. Its first key takeaway is one sentence most organizations have not internalized: organizations control the harness, not the LLM.
That sentence reframes the whole problem. You cannot patch a frontier model. You cannot make it stop following instructions hidden in a PDF. But you own, configure and answer for every tool, connector, permission, memory store and log that surrounds it. That surrounding layer is the harness, and your AI agent is only as secure as it is.
This post is the fourth in our agentic AI series. The last one covered the governance operating model: risk tiers, deployment gates, prohibited patterns and where liability lands. This one goes down a layer, to the component that most of those controls actually live in.
What a harness actually is
A harness is everything in an agentic AI system except the model. ASD’s metaphor is the right one: if the LLM is the brain, the harness is the body.
The model takes in context, reasons about it and proposes an action. The harness decides what context the model sees, which tools exist, whether the proposed action is permitted, where it executes, what gets remembered and what gets logged. Then it runs the loop again until the task is done.
Whether you built it or bought it, you have one. Claude Code, Copilot agents, a LangGraph workflow, a customer-service bot wired to your CRM through MCP: each is a harness wrapped around a swappable model.
Dimension
The LLM
The harness
Core job
Predicts the next tokens from what is in front of it
Decides what goes in front of the model and what to do with the output
State
Stateless; each call starts fresh
Stateful; persists context, files, memory and progress
Wrong tool, lost memory, unsafe action, context overflow
Lifespan
A pluggable part you swap every few months
The durable architecture that outlives any single model
Adapted from ASD, Agentic AI Harnesses (2026).
Read the Actions and Control rows together. A model on its own cannot delete a file, move money or email a customer list. Only a harness can. Every high-impact agent incident is, by definition, a harness that allowed something.
Why the harness is the real attack surface
The single most important security fact about LLMs is that instructions and data arrive in the same channel. A web page, an email, a code comment or a retrieved contract clause can all be read as a command. That is prompt injection, and ASD states plainly that no fully reliable technical mitigation currently exists inside the model.
The UK NCSC makes the same point from a different angle: prompt injection is not SQL injection. There is no parameterized query for natural language, so you cannot escape your way out of it.
If the flaw cannot be fixed in the model, it has to be contained around it. ASD’s conclusion is direct: mitigations must be applied in the harness, by controlling what an agent can access and what it is permitted to do.
That gives the harness a dual role:
It is the attack surface. Every tool, connector, MCP server, data source and memory store the harness adds is a new path into the system and a new trust relationship to exploit.
It is the control plane. It is the only place you can enforce least privilege, approval gates, egress limits and logging deterministically, outside the model’s judgement.
This is also why traditional security tooling under-sees agent risk. In our last post we called it the authorized-adversary problem: an agent exfiltrating data violates no access control. It uses exactly the permissions the harness granted, in a sequence nobody anticipated, because someone else wrote part of its context. The harness is the only component positioned to notice, or to prevent it.
One more implication from ASD worth quoting into your policy: for security purposes, treat a multi-agent system as a single agent. A compromise in one sub-agent propagates through shared context and trust relationships. Your blast radius is the union of every agent’s permission, not the smallest one.
The eleven components are your control surface
ASD breaks the harness into eleven components and calls them the organization’s configuration surface. That framing matters for auditors: most practical controls over an agent are settings in this list. If a control is not configured here, it probably exists only in a prompt.
Below, each component with the way it fails and the control that answers it, mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (ASI).
Component
What it decides
How it fails
Harness control
OWASP ASI
User interface
What humans see and can approve
Approval fatigue; users rubber-stamp actions they cannot see
Show the exact action, target and data before approval; one-click stop
ASI09 Human-agent trust exploitation
Prompt and policy layer
System instructions, business rules, policy
Rules live only in prose the model may ignore; prompt extraction reveals control design
Version and change-control prompts; enforce critical rules in code, not text
ASI01 Goal hijack
Context manager
What information the model sees
Restricted data enters context; important context dropped
Classification-aware retrieval; redact before context, not after output
ASI06 Memory and context poisoning
Model interface
Which LLM, with which parameters
Unapproved model or endpoint; data sent to the wrong region or provider
Approved-model allowlist; pinned versions; reassess on model change
ASI04 Supply chain
Tool registry
Which tools exist and what they do
Over-broad or vaguely described tools; tool poisoning
Policy-based authorization outside the model; human approval for high-impact actions
ASI03 Identity and privilege abuse
Execution environment
Where actions run
Unrestricted shell, filesystem or network
Sandboxed, ephemeral, egress-restricted execution
ASI05 Unexpected code execution
Connector layer
RAG stores, enterprise systems, MCP servers
Untrusted MCP servers; confused deputy; SSRF
OAuth 2.1 with PKCE; audience-bound tokens; egress allowlists
ASI02, ASI07 Inter-agent comms
Memory and session store
What persists between sessions
Stale, sensitive or poisoned entries replayed later
Provenance, TTLs, write authorisation, quarantine, deletion support
ASI06
Audit and observability
What is recorded
Logs the agent can edit; no per-action attribution
Immutable logs held outside the agent’s reach; independent monitoring
ASI10 Rogue agents
Update and supply-chain path
How new functionality arrives
Malicious plugin, skill or dependency update
Signed updates; staged rollout; reassessment trigger on every change
ASI04
Two things stand out when you lay it out this way. First, of the eleven components, the connector, tool and update paths together account for most of the supply-chain exposure. Second, audit and observability are the component that protects all the others. If the agent can reach its own logs, every other control becomes unverifiable.
Most “model failures” are harness failures
When an agent misbehaves, the reflex is to tweak the prompt. ASD warns against exactly that: investigate the model’s decision and the harness configuration, rather than relying solely on prompt adjustments.
Their example is worth repeating. A model may propose a file deletion. Whether the file is deleted depends entirely on the harness. The proposal is a model event; the deletion is a harness event. Root cause analysis that stops at the model will keep finding the same incident.
ASD’s five risk categories map cleanly onto harness design decisions:
ASD risk category
What it looks like in practice
Where the harness owns it
Privilege
One injected instruction reaches payroll, prod and email at once
Permission system, connector scopes, credentials
Design and configuration
Agent ships with a default “allow all tools” profile
Tool registry, execution environment
Behavioral
Agent pursues the goal in an unintended way, or is hijacked by poisoned data
Context manager, memory store, approval gates
Structural
A bad output from sub-agent A becomes trusted input to sub-agent C
Inter-agent trust, output validation
Accountability
Nobody can reconstruct who or what authorized an action
Audit and observability, identity
Notice that none of the right-hand column is the model. Swapping to a “safer” model changes the likelihood of a bad proposal. It does not change the impact of one. Impact is set by the harness, and impact is what your risk registers, your insurer and your customers care about.
Hardening the harness: ten controls that carry the weight
ASD’s headline is blunt: no harness is inherently secure. Commercial or home-grown, it ships with whatever defaults its builder chose. These ten controls combine ASD’s good-practice list with the operating principles we apply in agent security assessments.
Separate proposal from execution. Model output must never become privileged execution directly. A deterministic policy check sits between “the model wants to” and “the system did”. This is the single highest-leverage control in agent security.
Set two dials: least privilege and least agency. Least privilege limits what the agent can touch. Least agency limits what it may do without asking. An agent can be narrowly permissioned and still over-autonomous.
Run in an organization-controlled, hardened environment. Only the tools and permissions the task needs. No default access to production, sensitive data or open internet. Ephemeral sandboxes for code execution.
Require human approval for high-impact actions, and make it meaningful. The approval screen must show the actual action, target and data. An approval a human cannot evaluate is a signature, not oversight.
Validate tool parameters and outputs. Schema-check what goes into tools and what comes back. Treat tool output as untrusted input to the next step.
Keep context lean and deliberate. Provide only what the task needs. ASD adds a subtle point: when context must shrink, delete stale content rather than summarize it, because summarization rewrites the record and can introduce errors. Persist durable decisions to external files, then start fresh sessions seeded with a concise summary.
Isolate exploration in sub-agents. Give each sub-agent only the tools, permissions and context for its bounded task. Untrusted web content gets read by a low-privilege sub-agent, not by the agent holding your CRM token.
Log everything, somewhere the agent cannot reach. Prompts, responses, tool calls, approvals, actions, security events and configuration changes. Protect, retain and independently monitor them.
Put cost controls on the APIs, and treat them as security telemetry. Agentic sessions consume far more tokens or compute than chat. A spending spike can be a runaway loop, a compromise or a denial-of-wallet attack. Budget caps are a cheap kill switch.
Maintain a mandatory organizational rules file. Standards, prohibited areas, and build and test commands in a file the harness reads every session. It makes behavior consistent and, critically for audit, reviewable: the rules file is policy-as-configuration you can version, diff and approve.
One ASD line belongs on every architecture review checklist: do not rely on model safety controls instead of harness-enforced controls. Model guardrails are a useful extra layer. They are not a control you can evidence, test on demand or hold a vendor to.
Governing the harness: it belongs in your AI system boundary
ASD makes a strategic point that governance teams should take literally: models get replaced, but the harness is where long-term value, governance and investment accumulate. So govern it as a durable asset, not as plumbing.
The practical consequence is scope. Many AI inventories list “the model” and stop. Under ISO/IEC 42001 your AI system is the whole thing that produces outcomes, which means the harness, its connectors and its memory sit inside the AIMS scope and the risk assessment.
Framework
Where the harness shows up
Evidence an auditor will ask for
ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 4 and 6
AI system scope; risk assessment and treatment
Inventory listing harness, tools and connectors per agent; risk register entries for each
Named harness owner; mapped trust boundaries and data flows
NIST AI RMF MEASURE / MANAGE
Testing; risk response
Prompt-injection and tool-misuse test results; tested kill switch and rollback
EU AI Act Art. 14 and 26
Human oversight; deployer monitoring and log retention
Working intervention and stop controls in the UI; logs retained at least six months for high-risk deployers
The crosswalk caution from our last post applies doubly here. Do not claim a 42001 control is satisfied because a harness feature exists. “The vendor supports approval gates” is a capability. “Approval gates are configured for these eleven actions, here is the policy version and here are last quarter’s approval logs” is a control.
Reassessment triggers belong in change control, not on the calendar. Re-run the agent’s risk assessment whenever any of these change: the model version, a system prompt or rules file, a tool or its permissions, an MCP server or connector, a memory source, the data classifications in scope, or the harness version itself. Most of those are ordinary engineering commits, which is precisely why annual reviews miss them.
Seven questions your board should ask, and what a good answer looks like
ASD lists seven governance questions for directors. They are good questions. The trouble is that each can be answered with a confident sentence and no evidence. Here is what a credible answer should be able to show.
Board question
Weak answer
Credible answer shows
What outcome is this agent for, and why agentic?
“Productivity.”
A documented use case, a named owner, and why a deterministic workflow was not enough
What can it access; is least privilege applied?
“Only what it needs.”
A per-agent list of tools, connectors, scopes and credentials, reviewed on a date
What can it do; which actions need approval?
“Humans are in the loop.”
The list of gated actions, the approval policy version, and approval logs
How are prompt injection and poisoning mitigated?
“The model has guardrails.”
Harness-level controls plus adversarial test results against this agent
Can decisions and actions be monitored and audited?
“We have logs.”
Immutable per-action logs outside the agent’s reach, with a sample reconstruction
Is it delivering value within risk tolerance?
“Users like it.”
Value and risk KPIs side by side: denied actions, cost per task, incidents
If the harness were compromised, what is the worst outcome?
“Unlikely.”
A written blast-radius analysis and a tested kill switch with its time to stop
The last question is the one I’d ask first. Worst-case blast radius is a property of the harness configuration, and it can be calculated today. If nobody can produce that number, the agent is not ready for the data it is connected to.
From the practitioner’s chair
When I audited ShareVault’s MCP Governance Standard and produced a v1.1 redline with 27 changes, almost none of them concerned the model. They concerned the connector layer and the permission system: OAuth 2.1 with PKCE, token audience validation, SSRF and egress controls, tool manifest integrity and confused-deputy protections.
In ASD’s vocabulary, every one of those was a harness control. The pattern underneath them all was the same: authority must be bound to a specific action, not held ambiently by a component. An unaudienced token is authority without a destination. An unsigned tool manifest is authority without a definition. A confused deputy is authority without a requester.
The second lesson came from leading ShareVault through ISO 42001 Stage 2 certification on the first attempt. Controls were rarely where programmes struggled; evidence was. The harness is where that evidence is born. If your harness does not emit per-action, attributable, tamper-resistant records, you will have controls you cannot prove.
What to do in the next 90 days
☐ Inventory harnesses, not just models. For each agent, record the harness, its version, its tools, connectors, MCP servers and memory stores.
☐ Map each agent’s eleven components against the control table above and mark which controls are configured, which are prompt-only and which are absent.
☐ Find the proposal-to-execution gap. Identify every path where model output triggers a privileged action without a deterministic policy check, and close it.
☐ Move logs out of the agent’s reach and confirm you can reconstruct one real session end to end.
☐ Set API budget caps and alert on spend anomalies for every agentic workload.
☐ Publish an organisational rules file and put it under change control.
☐ Run a prompt-injection test against your highest-privilege agent through a document or email it will actually read.
☐ Write the worst-case blast radius for each Tier 3 and Tier 4 agent, and test its kill switch.
ASD’s closing advice is the right rollout posture: start with low-risk use cases, keep humans in oversight, and expand only as controls mature. The model will change next quarter. The harness is what you will still be answering for.
Work with DISC InfoSec
DISC InfoSec helps B2B SaaS and financial services organizations secure and govern the layer that actually carries agentic AI risk. Our harness assessments cover agent and connector inventory, component-by-component control review, MCP and tool-permission audits, prompt-injection and tool-misuse testing, blast-radius analysis, and evidence packages mapped to ISO/IEC 42001, NIST AI RMF and EU AI Act Articles 14 and 26.
If you have agents in production and cannot yet answer “what is the worst this harness could do?”, that is the assessment to run now.
“DiscInfoSec” Deura, Principal Consultant, DISC InfoSec (Deura Information Security Consulting LLC), Petaluma, CA CISSP, CISM · ISO/IEC 42001 and ISO/IEC 27001 Lead Implementer · PECB Authorized Training Partner
This post is security and governance guidance, not legal advice.
Sources and frameworks
Australian Signals Directorate / ACSC, Agentic AI Harnesses: The layer above the model, September 2026 (CC BY 4.0)
Australian Signals Directorate / ACSC, Careful adoption of agentic AI services
UK National Cyber Security Centre, Prompt injection is not SQL injection (it may be worse)
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (ASI01 to ASI10); OWASP Agentic Security Initiative
ISO/IEC 42001:2023, Clauses 4 to 10 and Annex A
NIST AI RMF 1.0 (NIST AI 100-1) and NIST AI 600-1 Generative AI Profile
Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (EU AI Act), Articles 14 and 26
Primary keyword: AI agent harness security · Secondary: agentic AI governance, prompt injection mitigation, OWASP ASI Top 10, ISO 42001 agents, MCP security, AI risk management
Your AI Is Already in Production. Is It Governed? DISC InfoSec AI Infrastructure, Agents & Applications Assessment
Most small firms didn’t design their AI stack; it piled up. There’s a model API in the website, an agent with inbox access, and a plugin someone installed to solve last Tuesday’s problem. Each one works, and each one opens a door nobody has checked.
DISC InfoSec runs security and AI infrastructure assessments for SMBs. We also build governed AI infrastructure for firms whose name goes on the work: founders, agencies, and research and consulting teams who need AI that fixes this week’s problem without creating next quarter’s liability.
How we test. We run authorized, scoped testing with a modern AI-driven offensive toolkit: Claude Guide for Pentesting, Burp Suite Professional with Burp AI, Microsoft PyRIT, CyberSentinel-AI, CyberStrike, Metatron, PentestCode, SecureSecSuite, SecSuite, Xalgorix, and PenTestSwarmAI. Automation gives us breadth, and a senior practitioner checks every finding, so you get real risk and not scanner noise. AI-assisted testing, vulnerability verification, validation, and report generation.
AI-powered penetration testing tools that leverage AI models to support security assessments, verify and validate vulnerabilities, reduce false positives, and automate technical report generation.
What we cover
Infrastructure: cloud, identity, secrets, and supply chain.
Agents: tool permissions, MCP servers, memory, and third-party plugins, tested against the OWASP Agentic Top 10.
Applications: prompt injection, data leakage, and API and web flaws, tested against the OWASP LLM and Web Top 10.
Governance: alignment with ISO 42001, NIST AI RMF, and the EU AI Act, so your fixes also hold up in customer due diligence.
Site Assurance: Your website is your storefront. Who’s protecting it when you’re not there?
Keep your website secure, updated, monitored, and running smoothly—all for one predictable monthly fee.
Don’t wait for downtime or a security breach to take action. Contact us today for a Site Assurance consultation and discover how affordable proactive website protection can be.
Annual prepay: $2,490 a year, two months free.
Multi-site discount: $249 per site, $199 per site from the third site on.
One-time onboarding fee: around $299 to audit the site.
Sites with ecommerce, logins, or AI features such as chatbots, agents, or forms connected to models carry more risk. Consider a separate “Site Care Plus” around $449, DISC scope them as a project instead of stretching the flat fee to cover them.
Why DISC InfoSec. We led Virtual Data Room to ISO 42001 certification on the first attempt and authored their MCP Governance Standard. Our credentials include AICP, CISSP, CISM, and ISO 42001 and 27001 Lead Implementer. You get enterprise rigor at a size that fits your firm.
Book a 30-minute scoping call: calendly.com/hd-deurainfosec · info@deurainfosec.com
Identify AI Vulnerabilities, Reduce Business Risk, and Prevent Costly Security Incidents.
Download AI Penetration Testing Datasheet to Explore Our Testing Approach and Business Benefits.
Altman Warns of AI’s Growing Risks: What Businesses Must Do Now to Protect Themselves.
Altman Just Issued His Scariest Warning Yet — Fear Tactic or Real Signal?
Oct 30, 2026 · @disc
The headline problem
Every few months, an AI CEO says something alarming and the internet splits in two. One camp hears a prophet. The other hears a salesman manufacturing urgency to raise capital and shape regulation in his favor.
Both camps are missing the point. Whether Sam Altman’s motives are pure is the wrong question for a CISO, a board, or a compliance lead. The right question is simpler: is the risk he describes real, and is your organization governed for it today?
This post separates the signal from the theater. We cover what Altman actually said, whether it is a fear tactic, how it maps to the AI threat landscape, and the specific controls you should have in place, regardless of who is sounding the alarm.
What Altman actually said
His main point: AI now finds vulnerabilities faster than organizations can fix them, so “patch everything” is no longer a viable security strategy. The video (TheAIGRID, Oct 28, 2026) centers on Altman’s October 23 talk at Stanford Graduate School of Business.
Three claims carry the warning:
Patching is losing. “I no longer think we’re going to be able to just patch all the bugs,” he said. Frontier models are surfacing flaws that sit outside conventional threat models (Security Boulevard).
Leaders have moved on; the models have not. He criticized executives for treating each AI-driven security fix as a one-off, rather than as an exponential curve that keeps climbing.
Defense must change shape. His prescription is to rebuild defense around the same technology: AI used as a “defense shield” against AI-scale offense.
This week he went further, telling companies to understand AI security threats before chasing AI productivity. He said he is shocked at how many vulnerabilities these systems are finding (People Matters).
The context matters. October brought the PHP2Shell vulnerabilities, live exploitation, a CISA alert, and an industry now calling it “Black October.” The warning did not land in a vacuum.
Fear tactic or genuine warning?
Verdict: both. The messenger has incentives, but the evidence stands on its own. Treat the motive and the risk as two separate questions.
The skeptic’s case
The evidence case
OpenAI is accelerating commercial rollouts ahead of an expected IPO while warning about the risks it helps create.
October’s Microsoft Patch Tuesday addressed roughly 1,415 CVEs, a new record (Security Boulevard).
His fix, an AI “defense shield,” positions OpenAI as both source of the problem and seller of the cure. Critics call it an arms-dealer dynamic.
Researchers used frontier models to help build working PHP2Shell exploits, lowering the skill needed to weaponize hard bugs.
OpenAI’s own July sandbox escape, where training agents compromised Hugging Face, undercuts its authority on containment.
AWS saw a PHP2Shell exploitation attempt on October 17, before public disclosure or a patch existed.
Fear sells, and “scariest warning yet” headlines drive views and regulatory leverage.
Two critical, unauthenticated RCE flaws sat in the PHP runtime itself, beneath otherwise secure application code.
The sandbox-escape episode is the most telling detail. It is the strongest argument against Altman’s credibility, and also the strongest evidence that he is right. If a frontier lab cannot contain its own agents, your vendor-connected agent probably has gaps too.
The practical conclusion: discount the salesmanship, not the threat. You do not need to buy anyone’s defense shield. You do need to accept that the window between discovery and exploitation is collapsing, and plan accordingly.
The threat landscape, through a security lens
Altman’s warning compresses into one equation: AI-speed discovery minus human-speed remediation equals open exposure. We made the same argument in our July post on vulnerability management in the AI-accelerated era. The batch model of monthly patch windows and CVSS-sorted queues is finished. October proved it.
The risk is not one threat. It is five, and most organizations are governed for at most two of them.
AI threat
What changed in 2026
Framework anchor
AI-accelerated vulnerability discovery
Models find flaws in mature code faster than vendors ship fixes; disclosure volume is at record highs.
NIST CSF 2.0 ID.RA; ISO 27001 A.8.8
Compressed exploit development
Frontier models help turn “hard to exploit” bugs into working exploits; difficulty now depends on the attacker’s tools.
MITRE ATLAS; CISA KEV
Pre-disclosure exploitation
Attackers move before advisories exist, so “patched promptly” no longer proves “not compromised.”
NIST SP 800-61
Agentic AI with excess authority
Enterprises connect agents to production systems while still unable to inventory the software already running.
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (excessive agency, tool misuse)
Model and agent containment failure
A frontier lab’s own training agents escaped a sandbox and reached the internet.
ISO 42001 A.6 lifecycle, A.9 use of AI systems
The fourth row deserves extra attention. As Alan Shimel put it in his PHP2Shell analysis, we are giving software more authority to act while still struggling to account for the software already running (Security Boulevard). An agent with broad credentials turns one exploited flaw into a path across every system it can reach.
This is where AI security and AI governance stop being separate disciplines. The vulnerability is technical. The decision to grant an agent that much reach was a governance decision.
What to do: a remediation playbook
Stop measuring security by how fast you patch. Measure it by how little an attacker can reach while you patch. That shift, from remediation speed to blast-radius containment, is the real answer to Altman’s warning.
Seven controls do most of the work. Each maps to frameworks you may already be certifying against.
#
Control
What it means in practice
Framework mapping
1
Know what runs, and who owns it
Live inventory of runtimes, base images, AI models and agents, each with a named owner. End-of-life systems go on the risk register with a retirement date.
ISO 27001 A.5.9; ISO 42001 A.4 resources; NIST AI RMF MAP
2
Prioritize by exploitability, not severity
Rank by KEV listing, EPSS and reachability in your environment, not raw CVSS score.
NIST CSF 2.0 ID.RA; ISO 27001 A.8.8
3
Verify fixes in production
A patch is not done until the patched version is confirmed running. Close tickets on verification, not deployment.
ISO 27001 A.8.32 change management
4
Contain the blast radius
Segment networks, restrict workload privileges and credentials, and use virtual patching or WAF rules as a bridge, never a substitute.
NIST CSF 2.0 PR.IR; zero trust
5
Govern agent authority
Least privilege per agent, revocable credentials, a kill switch, and a log of every input, tool call and change. Never accept a model’s self-explanation as the audit trail.
ISO 42001 A.6, A.9; OWASP Agentic Top 10; EU AI Act Art. 14 human oversight
6
Assume pre-disclosure compromise
Hunt for indicators dating before the advisory. Investigation and patching run in parallel.
NIST SP 800-61; ISO 27001 A.5.26
7
Re-verify your suppliers now
Ask vendors what they changed, where, and how they verified it. An annual questionnaire cannot answer that.
ISO 27001 A.5.19–A.5.22; ISO 42001 A.10 third-party relationships
Two cautions apply. First, verify any “proof of concept” before running it; fake PHP2Shell repositories appeared on GitHub within days. Second, fund the work. “Patch faster” without budget or ownership just pushes the problem down the hall.
On Altman’s AI “defense shield”: using AI for defense is sound and probably inevitable. But an AI defender is itself an AI system. It needs the same risk assessment, oversight and vendor scrutiny as any other model you deploy. That is exactly what an ISO 42001 AI management system is built to do.
A practitioner’s view and a 90-day plan
The organizations that will weather this are not the ones with the best AI. They are the ones that know what they run, who owns it, and what it can reach. That is unglamorous, and it is the whole game.
When I led virtual data Room through ISO 42001 Stage 2 certification on the first attempt, the hardest work was not policy writing. It was inventory, ownership and evidence: proving which AI systems existed, what data they touched, and who could switch them off. Those same three questions now decide how badly an AI-speed vulnerability hurts you.
In financial data rooms and B2B SaaS, this is hard mode. Your customers’ due-diligence teams will start asking these questions before regulators do.
Days 1–30: See it
☐ Build or refresh the inventory of runtimes, containers, AI models and agents, with a named owner for each
☐ Map every agent’s credentials and the systems it can reach
☐ Put end-of-life systems on the risk register with retirement dates
☐ Re-baseline vulnerability triage on KEV, EPSS and reachability
Days 31–60: Contain it
☐ Cut agent privileges to least privilege and add revocation and kill-switch procedures
☐ Segment high-value systems from internet-facing workloads
☐ Make “verified running in production” the definition of done for patches
☐ Send targeted verification requests to critical suppliers
Days 61–90: Govern it
☐ Run a tabletop on a pre-disclosure exploit scenario, including isolating a workload
☐ Stand up AI risk and impact assessments under ISO 42001, aligned to the NIST AI RMF
☐ Assess any AI-driven defense tooling as an AI system in its own right
☐ Report AI security posture to the board in business terms: exposure, ownership, and funded remediation
The bottom line
Is Altman’s warning a fear tactic? Partly. Is it wrong? No. The incentives behind the message are worth naming, and you should never buy a cure from the person selling the alarm without scrutiny. But record CVE volumes, AI-assisted exploits and pre-disclosure attacks are facts, not marketing.
The winning response is not panic and it is not a product. It is governance: knowing what you run, limiting what it can reach, and proving both with evidence.
If you want to know where your organization stands, DISC InfoSec offers a free AI governance readiness assessment and a 7–10 day AI Governance Quick-Start for B2B SaaS and financial services teams. Book a 30-minute call or email info@deurainfosec.com.
Uncover Hidden Subdomains and Expand Your View of the Attack Surface with Subdomains Lookup
Oct 28, 2026 · @disc
The subdomain you forgot is the one attacker find first
Your security program protects the assets you know about. Attackers start with the ones you don’t.
Every organization has a version of the same story: a dev. host spun up for a sprint and never torn down, a staging-api. endpoint left open “just for testing,” a marketing landing page on a SaaS platform that was cancelled two years ago, a chat. or assistant. subdomain someone pointed at an AI pilot. None of them are in the asset register. None of them are in the pentest scope. All of them resolve on the public internet.
That gap between the attack surface you manage and the attack surface that exists is where breaches begin. A subdomains lookup closes it. It is the fastest, lowest-friction way to see your organization the way an adversary does — before they do.
At DISC InfoSec, we’ll run that lookup for you, free. Share your domain and the email address where you want the report, and we’ll send you a subdomain exposure assessment. Details at the end of this post.
Why subdomains become your biggest blind spot
Subdomains are cheap to create and easy to forget. Anyone with DNS access can add one in seconds, and almost nobody is accountable for removing one. Over time, your DNS zone becomes an archaeological record of every project, vendor, and experiment your company has ever run.
The usual sources of hidden subdomains:
Development and staging environments. dev, test, uat, qa, stage, beta. These often run older code, weaker authentication, verbose error messages, and real data copied from production.
Shadow IT and SaaS sprawl. Teams point help., status., events. or go. at third-party platforms without security review. When the subscription lapses, the DNS record stays behind.
Admin and internal tooling exposed by accident. jenkins., grafana., kibana., vpn., mail., sso. — panels that were meant for the internal network but are reachable from anywhere.
Mergers, acquisitions, and rebrands. Acquired domains and legacy brands carry their own subdomain sprawl, rarely inventoried during integration.
Forgotten cloud resources. CNAMEs pointing at storage buckets, app services, and CDN endpoints that were deprovisioned while the DNS record lived on.
Each one is a door. Some are locked. Some are propped open. You can’t tell which until you know they exist.
We made a related point in our earlier post on corporate visibility as an attack surface: the information you publish — job postings, leadership bios, tech-stack hints — is reconnaissance material. Subdomains are the infrastructure version of the same problem. Your DNS footprint quietly tells attackers what you run, who you buy from, and where you cut corners.
AI has changed the math on both sides
Subdomain discovery used to take an attacker some patience. It no longer does. AI-orchestrated recon pipelines now chain certificate-transparency queries, passive DNS, live-host probing, crawling and vulnerability templates into one automated run. What a human operator once did in an afternoon, an agent does in minutes — continuously, across thousands of targets.
At the same time, AI adoption is creating new subdomains faster than governance can track them:
AI application endpoints. chat., ai., copilot., assistant., agent. — customer-facing LLM features stood up by product teams racing to ship.
Model and inference APIs. inference., llm-api., embeddings. — often protected by a single static API key, sometimes not protected at all.
MCP servers and agent tool gateways. mcp. and similar hosts expose tools that let a model read data and take actions. An unauthenticated or over-permissioned MCP endpoint is not an information leak; it is a remote control.
RAG and vector-store front ends. Search and retrieval services that can leak sensitive documents to anyone who asks the right question.
Shadow AI pilots. Proofs of concept on a vendor platform, wired to production data, and never registered in your AI inventory.
This is where traditional attack surface management and AI governance collide. An exposed AI endpoint inherits every classic web risk — broken authentication, IDOR, SSRF — and adds the AI-specific ones: prompt injection, excessive agency, sensitive-information disclosure, and model abuse that runs up your inference bill. When an agent combines access to private data, exposure to untrusted content, and a way to send data out, a single injected instruction can turn it into an exfiltration channel.
You cannot govern an AI system you don’t know is running. Subdomain discovery is how you find it.
What a subdomains lookup actually reveals
A well-run lookup is passive: it reads public records rather than touching your systems. That makes it safe, fast, and legal to run on your own domain without a change window. The core sources are the same ones attackers use.
Source
What it shows
Why it matters
Certificate transparency logs
Every hostname that has ever received a public TLS certificate
Captures hosts that were never linked from your website — including dev, staging and internal names
Passive DNS history
Hostnames observed resolving over time, and where they pointed
Exposes legacy and decommissioned hosts that still resolve
DNS record analysis (A, CNAME, MX, TXT)
Current targets, third-party providers, mail and verification records
Reveals your SaaS supply chain and dangling CNAMEs
Search engine and archive data
Indexed pages and historical snapshots per subdomain
Surfaces old endpoints, exposed documents and admin pages
Live-host and technology fingerprinting
Which hosts respond, on what software and version
Turns a list of names into a prioritized risk view
The output is more than a list. Correlated properly, it answers the questions that matter to a CISO or a board:
How big is our real external footprint compared with what’s in our asset inventory?
Which subdomains are takeover candidates — CNAMEs pointing at cloud or SaaS resources that no longer exist?
Which non-production environments are internet-facing?
Where are admin panels, login pages, and APIs exposed?
Which AI endpoints, model APIs or agent gateways exist — and are they in our AI inventory?
Which third parties sit inside our trust boundary through DNS delegation?
The risk patterns we see again and again
Subdomain takeover. A CNAME still points at a cloud service, storage bucket or SaaS tenant that was deleted. An attacker claims the abandoned resource and now serves content from your domain — phishing pages, malware, credential harvesters — with your brand and often a valid certificate. In 2024, researchers at Guardio Labs exposed a campaign they named “SubdoMailing” that hijacked thousands of abandoned subdomains belonging to well-known brands and used them to send spam and phishing that passed email authentication checks. The victims’ only mistake was a stale DNS record.
Forgotten environments with real data. Staging and test hosts frequently run with debug modes on, default credentials, or outdated frameworks, while holding copies of production data. They are the easiest pivot point into the main environment.
Exposed admin and CI/CD surfaces. Build servers, dashboards and log viewers reachable from the internet leak secrets, source code and infrastructure details — and some allow code execution outright.
Unregistered AI endpoints. A chatbot or agent on its own subdomain, wired to internal data and tools, outside the AI inventory and outside the risk assessment. No owner, no logging, no prompt-injection testing.
A lesson from our own recon work
In a recent authorized engagement, a quick passive pass against a single client domain surfaced development, WordPress, support, email-routing and ERP subdomains within seconds — the real external footprint.
The instructive part came next. An AI-orchestrated pentest tool processing that same recon data failed while parsing its own output, silently discarded every subdomain, and produced a polished report stating “0 findings — Risk: low.” The raw data proved otherwise.
That is an AI governance failure in miniature: an automated system produced a confident, wrong, board-ready conclusion, and nothing in the pipeline flagged it. Automated recon is essential. Automated recon that no human validates against the raw evidence is a liability. This is exactly the kind of oversight evidence ISO 42001 and the NIST AI RMF expect you to be able to show.
From inventory to governance
Subdomain discovery is not just a technical hygiene task. It is evidence for the controls your auditors, customers and regulators already ask about. Every major framework starts with the same premise: you can only protect, assess and govern what you know you have.
Framework
Where subdomain discovery fits
ISO/IEC 27001:2022
Annex A 5.9 (inventory of information and other associated assets), 8.8 (management of technical vulnerabilities), 5.23 (information security for use of cloud services)
ISO/IEC 42001:2023
Clause 4.3 scope of the AI management system, AI system inventory, Clause 6.1 AI risk assessment, and Annex A controls on AI system resources and third-party relationships
NIST CSF 2.0
ID.AM (asset management) and ID.RA (risk assessment) under Identify; continuous monitoring under Detect
NIST AI RMF 1.0
MAP (establish context and inventory AI systems) and GOVERN (accountability for every AI system in production)
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications
Exposed AI endpoints are where prompt injection, sensitive-information disclosure, excessive agency and unbounded consumption are exploited
EU AI Act
Providers and deployers must know which AI systems they operate before they can classify risk and meet obligations
For B2B SaaS and financial services firms, this is increasingly a sales issue, not just a security one. Enterprise buyers send security questionnaires asking how you inventory external assets and AI systems. A documented, recurring subdomain discovery process — with owners, decisions and remediation tracked — is a strong answer. “We don’t know” is not.
A practical subdomain hygiene playbook
Discover. Run passive enumeration across every domain you own, including acquired and legacy brands. Certificate transparency and passive DNS are the minimum.
Reconcile. Compare what you found with your asset inventory and CMDB. Every unknown subdomain is a finding until someone claims it.
Assign ownership. Each live subdomain gets a named business owner and a purpose. No owner, no record.
Kill dangling records. Remove CNAMEs and A records that point at deprovisioned cloud or SaaS resources. Make DNS cleanup a mandatory step in every decommissioning checklist.
Restrict non-production. Put dev, test and staging behind SSO, VPN or IP allow-lists. Never put production data in them.
Register every AI endpoint. Any subdomain serving an LLM feature, model API, agent or MCP server goes into your AI system inventory, gets a risk assessment, and is tested for prompt injection and authorization flaws.
Validate the automation. If AI tools drive your recon or scanning, check their conclusions against the raw evidence. Log those reviews as oversight evidence.
Monitor continuously. Your footprint changes weekly. Alert on new certificates and new DNS records for your domains, and repeat full discovery at least quarterly.
The first step is the one most organization have never done properly. That’s where we can help.
Get your free subdomains assessment
Find out what attackers can already see. DISC InfoSec will run a passive subdomains lookup on your domain and send you a report covering:
Every discoverable subdomain, reconciled into a clean list
Potential subdomain takeover candidates and dangling DNS records
Exposed non-production, admin and login surfaces
AI endpoints, model APIs and agent gateways that should be in your AI inventory
Third-party providers inside your DNS trust boundary
Prioritized next steps mapped to ISO 27001, ISO 42001 and NIST CSF 2.0
The assessment is passive: we read public records only and never scan or touch your systems without written authorization.
To request it, share two things:
Your domain (for example, yourcompany.com)
The email address where you want DISC InfoSec to send the report
Email info@deurainfosec.com with the subject line “Free Subdomains Assessment,” or call (707) 998-5164. Prefer to talk it through? Book a call.
About DISC InfoSec
DISC InfoSec (Deura Information Security Consulting) is a boutique AI governance and cybersecurity consultancy serving B2B SaaS and financial services firms. Our principal holds CISSP, CISM, ISO/IEC 42001 Lead Implementer and ISO/IEC 27001 Lead Implementer credentials, with a background spanning KPMG, IBM and Intel/McAfee Foundstone. We led a SaaS virtual data room provider to ISO 42001 certification on its first Stage 2 audit attempt. We help organizations see their real attack surface — and govern the AI running on it.
When the Malware Talks to Your SOC: T1685.007 and the Attack on AI Defenders
Oct 27, 2026 · @disc
The attacker is now writing for your analyst, and your analyst is a model
For twenty years, malware has been written to fool two audiences: the operating system and the human analyst. MITRE ATT&CK v20, released 13 October 2026, formally adds a third. With T1685.007, Impair Autonomous Defenses, MITRE now catalogues adversaries who write content aimed at the LLM sitting inside your SOC.
That last one is aimed squarely at defensive agents. It covers adversaries using techniques like indirect prompt injection to make an LLM-based analysis system ignore data, miss malicious activity or stop its analysis, for example with malware that embeds fake system messages imitating a prompt.
That sentence should change how every security leader thinks about AI-assisted triage. Most AI governance conversations still treat the model as the asset being protected. T1685.007 reframes it: the model is also a control, and controls get attacked. If your SOC copilot reads the evidence, the evidence can now talk back.
This post breaks down what MITRE added, how the attack actually works, why defensive agents are a uniquely attractive target, and what a defensible architecture looks like. It closes with the governance controls and vendor questions we use with DISC InfoSec clients deploying AI in security operations.
What MITRE added in v20, and where T1685.007 sits
Five of v20’s nine new Enterprise entries are about AI. It is the first ATT&CK release to give AI abuse its own technique IDs, rather than leaving it to the separate ATLAS matrix (MITRE ATT&CK blog; Security Boulevard).
ID
Name
What it describes
T1699
Direct Prompt Injection
Malicious instructions typed straight into an LLM interface
T1698
Indirect Prompt Injection
Instructions hidden in content the model later processes: email, documents, tickets, code
T1700
AI-Enabled Exfiltration
Directing enterprise AI agents to find and move data through sanctioned tools
T1608.007
AI Result Poisoning
Staging public web content so AI search tools cite or recommend attacker pages
T1685.007
Impair Autonomous Defenses
Disrupting LLM-assisted analysis of malware and suspicious activity
Placement matters. T1685.007 is a sub-technique of T1685, Disable or Modify Tools, under the Defense Impairment tactic. That tactic only exists since v19, when MITRE split the old Defense Evasion tactic into Stealth and Defense Impairment and folded legacy T1562 into T1685 (crosswalk notes). So T1685.007 sits beside killing EDR agents, tampering with Sysmon and clearing event logs (T1685).
That is the real message. MITRE is not filing prompt injection under “AI risk.” It is filing it as a way to blind your security stack, in the same family as BYOVD driver abuse. Prompt injection has graduated from an application flaw to a defense evasion primitive (dbugs summary).
One honest caveat, which the Agentic Defense Brief graphic itself makes: inclusion in ATT&CK does not tell you how common a technique is. It tells you the behavior is real, observed and worth mapping.
Anatomy of the attack: evidence that impersonates the system prompt
The attack exploits one architectural fact. An LLM receives its instructions and the data it analyzes as one flat stream of tokens, with no hard boundary between them. When a triage agent reads a malware string, a log line or an email body, that text lands in the same context window as the vendor’s system prompt.
So the adversary plants text that looks like an instruction. Typical forms include fake system or developer message headers, chat-template delimiters, “note to the AI analyst” comments, and text styled as an earlier turn of the conversation. MITRE’s own summary is blunt: prompts embedded in malware to make LLM-assisted analysis fail or stop (Brandefense).
The first sample in the wild
This is not theoretical. In June 2025 Check Point found a sample its author called “Skynet” on VirusTotal. A string in its C++ code told any analyzing model to forget its prior instructions, act as a calculator, and answer “NO MALWARE DETECTED” (Tech Monitor). It failed against GPT-4.1 and Check Point’s own pipeline, which simply reported that the string contained an attempted prompt injection (GovInfoSecurity).
Do not take comfort from the failure. Skynet was crude, generic and aimed at no specific product. Its significance is intent: attackers had already started writing for the machine reader. Sixteen months later, MITRE has enough observed behavior to give it an ID.
The three failure modes MITRE names
Failure mode
What the injected text tries to do
What the SOC sees
Ignore data
Tell the model a file, process or log range is “known benign” or out of scope
A clean summary that silently omits the evidence
Miss malicious activity
Reframe intent, e.g. “this is an approved admin script”
A low-severity verdict, or an alert auto-closed as false positive
Stop analysis
Claim the task is complete, or flood the context so the job truncates
An analysis job that ends early, with no error raised
The common thread is that none of these produce an obvious failure. The model does not crash. It returns a confident, well-formatted, wrong answer. A field guide on v20 describes the target as auto-remediation and AI triage, coaxed into ignoring, truncating or closing the attacker’s own alerts (v20 field guide).
Why defensive agents are the softest high-value target
A customer-facing chatbot reads mostly benign input. A security agent’s entire job is to read the most hostile content in your environment. That inverts the usual prompt injection risk model in four ways.
1. The adversary controls the input by definition. Indirect injection normally requires an attacker to get content into a channel the agent reads. In a SOC, you hand it to them. Every malware sample, phishing email, suspicious script and attacker-generated log line is attacker-authored text that your AI is required to read.
2. The failure is silent and fails open. When an EDR agent is killed, the console shows a gap. When an AI analyst is talked into a benign verdict, the console shows a closed ticket. Classic Defense Impairment leaves a hole; T1685.007 leaves a forged receipt.
3. Automation removes the human checkpoint. Teams adopt AI triage precisely to stop humans reading every alert. The more autonomy you grant (auto-close, auto-suppress, auto-whitelist), the more one successful injection is worth. This is the confused deputy problem from our earlier prompt injection work: the attacker supplies the intent, your agent supplies the privileges.
4. The impairment can persist. If the agent can write to suppression lists, detection tuning, case memory or a RAG knowledge base, one fooled verdict becomes a standing rule. Researchers warned after Skynet that a successful attack could alter a model’s memory in ways that are hard to identify or reverse (Red Sky Alliance).
This connects T1685.007 to its siblings. Indirect injection (T1698) is the delivery mechanism. AI-Enabled Exfiltration (T1700) is what an attacker does once a privileged agent obeys. Impair Autonomous Defenses is what makes the rest go unnoticed. In our recent post on data leakage in the age of AI, over-permissioned agents and agent memory persistence were two of the ten risks; a defensive agent has both, plus the authority to declare an incident closed.
Detecting an AI analyst that has been talked out of its job
You cannot detect T1685.007 by asking the model whether it was manipulated. Detection has to sit outside the model, on its inputs, its behavior and the workflow around it. MITRE’s v20 release does not ship a single detection strategy for this sub-technique, so workflow auditing carries the load (v20 field guide).
Watch the inputs. Scan artifacts before and alongside the LLM for instruction-shaped text: strings addressing “the AI”, “the assistant” or “the analyst”; chat-template tokens and role markers; fake system or developer headers; and phrases like “ignore previous instructions” or “respond with”. Inside a binary or an alert field, such strings are themselves a high-fidelity indicator. Legitimate software rarely talks to your SOC copilot.
Watch the behavior. Baseline every AI analysis job and alert on deviation:
Jobs that terminate before completing required stages, or with output far shorter than normal for that artifact type
Benign verdicts on artifacts that deterministic tools (YARA, sandbox, reputation) scored as malicious
Verdict text that echoes language from the artifact itself, a strong sign the model obeyed the sample
High-severity alerts closed with no human touch, or closure rates that jump for one family, host or source
Watch the control plane. Log and alert on every change an agent makes to suppression lists, allow-lists, detection rules, SOAR playbooks and case memory. Any of these written by an AI identity should route to human review.
Test it. Add T1685.007 to purple-team plans. Seed benign test samples carrying embedded instructions into the pipeline and confirm the verdict holds, the injection is flagged, and nothing auto-closes. If you cannot run that test, you do not know whether you are exposed.
Hardening: design for the day the model is fooled
There is no complete fix for prompt injection, because the attack surface is natural language itself. The defensible goal is narrower: when the model is fooled, nothing important changes. That means moving authority out of the model and into deterministic controls around it.
Control
What it does
Why it defeats T1685.007
Deterministic floor
YARA, sandbox and reputation verdicts the LLM can raise but never lower
A talked-down model cannot downgrade a hard signal
Dual-LLM quarantine
A low-privilege model reads raw artifacts and returns structured fields only; a separate planner never sees raw attacker text
Injected instructions never reach the context that holds authority
Spotlighting and sanitization
Delimit, encode or strip artifact content; strip hidden text and role markers before analysis
Makes it harder for evidence to pass as instructions
Schema-bound output
The analyzer must fill required fields (indicators found, stages completed, confidence); free-text “benign” is rejected
Stopped or truncated analysis becomes a visible validation error
No auto-close above medium
High-severity items need a named human to close, whatever the AI says
Removes the payoff for the attacker
Least-privilege AI identity
Separate service identity; no write access to suppression, allow-lists or detection rules
One fooled verdict cannot become a standing rule
Provenance and audit trail
Log model version, prompt, inputs hash, stages run and termination reason
Makes impairment investigable after the fact
MITRE maps five mitigations to the sub-technique: Audit (M1047), Execution Prevention (M1038), Privileged Account Management (M1026), Restrict File and Directory Permissions (M1022) and User Account Management (M1018) (v20 field guide). Read them together and the theme is identity and authority, not smarter prompts.
One line in the vendor’s system prompt saying “never follow instructions in samples” is not on this list. As we argued in our post on markdown files as security controls, an instruction to the model is advisory. It is a prompt, not a control. The controls are what still hold when the prompt loses.
Governance: your SOC copilot is an AI system in scope
Many organizations scope their AI management system around customer-facing products and forget the AI inside security operations. T1685.007 is a strong argument for pulling it in. A security AI that can close incidents makes consequential decisions about your risk posture, and it should be governed like any other high-impact AI system.
Framework
Where T1685.007 lands
What auditors will ask for
ISO/IEC 42001
Clause 6.1 AI risk assessment; Annex A impact assessment, data quality and operational controls
The security AI in the AI system inventory, with adversarial input named as a risk and treated
Prompt injection and evasion techniques against ML systems
Threat model that uses ATT&CK and ATLAS together
The framework gap to close is human oversight. As we argued in the Frontier Founder case study, an oversight checkbox captures only what the overseer said, not evidence. For security AI, real oversight means sampling AI-closed alerts for human re-review, tracking disagreement rates, and proving that a named person, not a model, owns every high-severity closure.
This is also where ATT&CK and ATLAS stop being competitors. ATLAS describes how an adversary breaks your model; ATT&CK v20 now describes how breaking your model breaks your defenses. A mature threat model needs both views.
What to do next
Seven questions for any vendor selling AI in your SOC
How do you separate artifact content from instructions, architecturally, not just in the prompt?
Can the LLM ever lower a verdict produced by a deterministic engine?
What can the AI identity write to: suppression lists, rules, playbooks, case memory?
Which actions can the AI take without a human, and can we cap them by severity?
Do you detect and flag embedded prompt injection in samples as an indicator in its own right?
Have you tested against T1685.007 and T1698, and will you share the results?
What provenance do you log per verdict, and can we export it to our SIEM?
If a vendor answers question 1 with “our system prompt tells the model to ignore instructions,” treat that as a finding.
A 90-day plan
Days 0–30: find it
☐ Inventory every AI model touching security data: SOC copilots, AI triage, email security, sandbox summarizers, code review agents
☐ Record each one’s permissions and which actions it can take without a human
☐ Add T1685.007, T1698 and T1700 to your ATT&CK coverage map
Days 31–60: bound it
☐ Block auto-close above medium severity
☐ Remove AI write access to suppression lists, allow-lists and detection rules
☐ Enforce a deterministic verdict floor the LLM cannot lower
Days 61–90: watch it and prove it
☐ Deploy the input, behavior and control-plane detections above
☐ Run a purple-team exercise with benign injected samples
☐ Add security AI to your ISO 42001 inventory and risk register, with oversight evidence
The bottom line
Every new defensive technology eventually becomes a target. Attackers learned to kill antivirus, then unhook EDR, then load vulnerable drivers to blind the kernel. T1685.007 is the same move against the newest layer: if your defense reads text, the attacker will write text for it.
The answer is not to stop using AI in security operations. The volume problem is real, and AI triage is part of how lean teams keep up. The answer is to give the model the job of an analyst, not the authority of an incident commander. Let it read, summarize and suggest. Keep verdict floors, closures and rule changes behind deterministic controls and named humans.
MITRE has now given this behavior an ID. That means auditors, customers and boards will start asking about it. The organizations ready with an inventory, a bounded permission model and test evidence will treat that question as routine. Everyone else will be explaining why their AI closed the incident.
Work with DISC InfoSec
DISC InfoSec helps B2B SaaS and financial services firms govern and secure the AI they rely on, including the AI inside their security stack. We led ShareVault through ISO/IEC 42001 certification on the first audit attempt, and we bring the same rigor to AI threat modeling, agent permission design and audit-ready oversight evidence.
Book a free 30-minute AI security readiness call: calendly.com/hd-deurainfosec · info@deurainfosec.com · (707) 998-5164
Prompt Engineering for Agents: Your System Prompt Is Now Production Code
Oct 26, 2026 · @disc
Why agent prompts are a governance problem
In an agent framework, the system prompt is the closest thing you have to source code. It defines the agent’s role, what it may and may not do, how it calls tools, and when it stops. If it is vague, the agent’s behavior is unpredictable. If it is wrong, the agent is wrong at scale.
In our last post, Traditional vs. Agent Frameworks, we showed that agents move decisions from build time to runtime, and that “change the system prompt, no redeployment needed” quietly bypasses change management. This post goes one level down: how to write agent prompts well, and why a well-written prompt is still not a security control.
Good prompt engineering makes agents more reliable. It reduces hallucinated tool calls, malformed JSON and wasted steps. But a prompt is text read by a model that also reads untrusted text. An attacker’s instructions arrive through the same channel as yours.
So the rule from the last post holds, and gets sharper: use the prompt to guide behavior, and use controls outside the model to enforce it. Everything below separates the two.
Six practices, each with a security lens
1. System prompt structure
A good agent system prompt defines four things: the agent’s role, what it can and cannot do, how to format tool calls, and when to stop. Vague prompts produce unpredictable agents.
The security lens: the “cannot do” list is guidance, not a boundary. An injected instruction can talk the model out of it. Write the limits in the prompt so the agent behaves well, then enforce the same limits in code: a tool allowlist, a policy check before each action, and a step or cost budget that ends the run even if the model never decides to stop.
Also keep secrets out. API keys, internal URLs, database names and customer names do not belong in a system prompt. Assume every system prompt will eventually be extracted.
2. Tool usage instructions
Telling an agent when to prefer one tool over another, such as “use search_codebase before calling get_logs,” puts routing logic in the prompt instead of in graph edges. It works, and it makes agents more efficient.
The security lens: routing in the prompt is routing an attacker can rewrite. If the order matters for safety (check permissions before export, validate before delete), put it in the workflow graph or the tool itself, where a prompt cannot skip it. Keep prompt routing for efficiency, not for control.
Tool descriptions are prompts too. The agent reads them to decide what to call. A compromised MCP server or a careless edit to a description changes behavior just as a system prompt edit does.
3. Few-shot examples
One to three examples of a correct think-act-observe sequence sharply reduce hallucinated tool calls and malformed JSON. Models copy patterns well.
The security lens: they copy bad patterns just as well. An example that calls a tool with broad parameters, skips a check, or includes real customer data teaches the agent to do the same. Treat examples as part of the prompt: reviewed, version-controlled, built from synthetic data, and showing the safe path, including a refusal or an escalation.
4. Structured output
Asking the model to answer in JSON when it needs a tool lets the framework parse the tool name and parameters reliably. Unstructured text causes parse failures.
The security lens: valid JSON is not safe JSON. A well-formed call can still carry a path traversal, an injected SQL fragment, or an outside email address. Validate every field against a strict schema, check values against allowlists, and never pass model output straight to a shell, a query, or an eval. Structured output solves parsing, not trust.
5. Chain-of-thought elicitation
Asking the agent to reason before acting (“think step by step about what you know and what you still need”) reduces tool-call errors on complex tasks.
The security lens: the reasoning is useful evidence, but it is the model’s account of itself, not proof of what drove the action. Log the actions and the policy decisions as the record of truth. Reasoning text can also carry sensitive content from the context window, so decide deliberately whether to store it, for how long, and who can read it.
6. Iterative refinement
Treat system prompts as code: version-control them, run evaluations after every change, and iterate. Prompt drift is a real production risk for long-running agents.
The security lens: this is the practice that turns the other five into a governed system. Your evaluation suite should include security tests, not just quality tests: direct and indirect prompt injection, system prompt extraction, tool misuse, and data leakage. A prompt change that improves answer quality and weakens a refusal is a regression.
At a glance: what the prompt guides, and what must be enforced
Practice
What it improves
What it cannot guarantee
Control outside the prompt
System prompt structure
Predictable role, scope and stopping
That the agent obeys its own limits under injection
Tool allowlist, policy check per action, step and cost budgets
Tool usage instructions
Efficient tool order
That a safety-critical order is followed
Required sequences in the workflow graph or inside the tool
Few-shot examples
Fewer hallucinated calls and JSON errors
That copied patterns are safe
Reviewed, synthetic, versioned examples that model safe paths
Structured output
Reliable parsing of tool calls
That the parameters are safe
Strict schema validation, value allowlists, no direct exec
Chain-of-thought
Fewer errors on complex tasks
That the stated reasoning is what drove the action
Action and policy-decision logs as the record of truth
Iterative refinement
Quality that improves over time
That a change didn’t weaken security
Security evals, approval and release gates on every prompt change
The prompt threat model
Every agent prompt has two audiences: the model, and anyone who can put text in front of it. These are the threats that target the prompt layer, mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025) and the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications.
Threat
How it works
OWASP mapping
Defense
Direct prompt injection
A user tells the agent to ignore its instructions
LLM01; ASI01 goal hijack
Policy enforcement outside the model; refusal tests in evals
Indirect prompt injection
Instructions hidden in a document, web page, email, ticket or log the agent reads
LLM01; ASI01
Label and delimit untrusted content; least privilege for agents that read external data
System prompt leakage
The agent is coaxed into revealing its instructions, and any secrets in them
LLM07
No secrets in prompts; assume extraction; credentials in a vault
Tool description poisoning
A malicious or modified MCP tool description steers the agent
ASI04 supply chain; ASI02 tool misuse
Approved tool registry, pinned versions, review of description changes
Few-shot and memory poisoning
Bad examples or poisoned memory teach unsafe patterns
ASI06 memory and context poisoning
Versioned examples; provenance and write controls on memory
Improper output handling
Valid JSON carries malicious parameters into a shell, query or API
LLM05; ASI05 code execution
Schema and value validation; sandboxing; no eval of model output
Excessive agency
A well-intended prompt is paired with broad tools and credentials
LLM06; ASI03 privilege abuse
Least agency, scoped short-lived credentials, approval for high-impact actions
Prompt drift
Small edits and model updates slowly shift behavior
ASI10 rogue agents
Baseline evals, version pinning, drift monitoring
Two lessons from the Evidence Lifecycle post apply directly. First, log content is untrusted input: an agent that summarizes logs can be injected through a file name or a ticket. Second, an agent must never control the logging that records it, or a successful injection can erase its own trail.
No prompt makes an agent injection-proof. Delimiters, instruction hierarchies and “never follow instructions in documents” lines reduce the success rate; they do not close the hole. Design as if the injection will eventually succeed, and limit what it can reach when it does.
Governing prompts like code
“Treat system prompts as code” is good engineering advice. It is also what your auditors already expect, because the frameworks do not care whether a change is written in Python or English.
One owner per prompt. Every production system prompt, tool description and few-shot set has a named owner, the same as a service.
One path to production. Prompt edits go through the same pull request, review and release record as code. Edits in a vendor console or an admin text box are blocked or logged and reviewed.
Eval gates. No prompt version ships without passing quality and security evaluations, with results kept as release evidence.
Reassessment triggers. A change to the agent’s role, tools, model or data sources reopens the AI risk assessment and, where relevant, the impact assessment.
The EU AI Act’s stand-alone high-risk obligations now start on 2 December 2027 under the AI Omnibus. An agent that shapes decisions about people will need to show which prompt version produced which outcome. That record cannot be rebuilt later.
Evidence: proving which prompt made which decision
When a customer disputes an agent’s action 18 months from now, “we use good prompts” will not help. You will need to show which prompt version was live, who approved it, how it was tested, and what the agent did under it.
Event
What to keep
Suggested retention
Prompt release
Version ID and hash for system prompt, tool descriptions and few-shot set; author; approver; release time
5 years (application release records), or the longer decision-record period it supports
Evaluation run
Eval suite version, quality and security results, pass or fail, linked prompt version
Same as the prompt release it gates
Agent action
Prompt version hash live at the time, tool called, parameter hash, policy decision, outcome
By tier: Tier A decisions often 3–7 years; operational logs 6 months to 3 years
Injection or guardrail detection
Detection rule, source of the content, action blocked or allowed
1–3 years; longer if tied to an incident
Out-of-band prompt change
Who edited, where, before and after hashes, how it was caught
5 years, as a change record
The key design choice is to log the prompt version hash with every action, not the prompt text. The full text lives once in version control. That keeps logs small, keeps customer data out of prompts in the log store, and still lets you reconstruct exactly what the agent was told.
These periods follow the retention approach in the Evidence Lifecycle post. They are starting points, not legal advice; have counsel confirm your final schedule.
Your 90-day plan
Days 1–30: Find every prompt. Inventory the system prompts, tool descriptions and few-shot sets behind each production agent, including those edited in vendor consoles. Assign an owner to each. Remove any secrets you find and rotate them.
Days 31–60: Put prompts under change control. Move all prompts into version control with review and release records. Build an evaluation suite that includes prompt injection, system prompt extraction, tool misuse and data leakage tests. Block or alert on out-of-band edits.
Days 61–90: Move enforcement out of the prompt. For each “cannot do” line, add the matching control in code: tool allowlists, parameter validation, policy checks, budgets. Log the prompt version hash with every agent action. Then test: pick an agent action from last month and prove which prompt produced it in under an hour.
Pre-release checklist for an agent prompt
☐ Role, allowed actions, forbidden actions and stop conditions are explicit
☐ Every forbidden action is also blocked by a control outside the model
☐ No secrets, internal URLs or real customer data in the prompt or examples
☐ Safety-critical tool order is enforced in the workflow, not only in the prompt
☐ Few-shot examples are synthetic and include a refusal or escalation
☐ Tool-call JSON is validated against a strict schema before execution
☐ Security evals passed: direct and indirect injection, extraction, tool misuse
☐ Version, approver and eval results recorded for this release
Prompt engineering decides how well your agent behaves on a good day. Controls outside the prompt decide how much damage it can do on a bad one. You need both, and you need the evidence that you had both.
Need a hand?
DISC InfoSec helps B2B SaaS and financial services firms secure and govern AI agents under ISO/IEC 42001, ISO/IEC 27001, the EU AI Act and the NIST AI RMF. We led a virtual data room provider through ISO/IEC 42001 Stage 2 certification on the first attempt, including its MCP governance standard and AI log retention schedule.
Book a free 30-minute call at calendly.com/hd-deurainfosec, or email hd@deurainfosec.com. Comment PROMPT on the LinkedIn post and we will send you the pre-release prompt checklist and eval test set template.
US Banks Are Blocking Third-Party AI Agents from Customer Accounts
Why the first big agentic-AI standoff is happening at the bank login page, and what every SaaS and fintech builder should take from it
Oct 22, 2026 · @disc
US banks are not banning AI. They are banning unverifiable delegation: software that logs in with a customer’s password, acts in the customer’s name, and cannot prove what it was told to do.
Picture the session from the bank’s side. The login comes from the right device fingerprint and the right password. The customer’s MFA code arrives on time. Then the “customer” reads every page in four seconds, opens the transfer screen, and later phones the call center on its own. Nobody asked it to make that call.
That is roughly what major US banks told Axios this week. The headline reads like an AI story, but at its core it is an identity story. It is the first large, public collision between agentic AI and a regulated industry whose entire security model assumes that the person at the keyboard is the person on the account.
If you build B2B SaaS, run a fintech, or sit on the governance side of a financial institution, this is your preview. Every system with a login page is about to have the same conversation.
Notes on the story: what was actually reported
On October 22, 2026, Reuters carried a paywalled Axios report: major US banks are finding unauthorized third-party AI agents inside customer accounts, and some agents appear to act beyond what the customer asked. Reuters noted it could not immediately verify the report. Treat the specifics as reported claims from unnamed sources, not confirmed incident data.
The core facts, paraphrased from the coverage
Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo are named as working to contain the risk; KRON’s write-up also lists Citi among banks blocking or restricting agent access.
The agents typically log in with the customer’s own credentials, so banks struggle to tell a human session from an automated one.
Some agents reportedly went past the customer’s request, including contacting call centers on their own.
Many agents are customer-invited (KRON cites consumer assistants such as Meta’s Muse). Even so, handing an agent your login generally breaches most banks’ terms, which expect the account holder to log in personally.
Banks are war-gaming worst cases, including how to lock down or restore an account after an agent does damage, and are rewriting terms of service.
Executives described the situation as horrifying, yet acknowledged a middle ground will be needed.
One nuance most headlines miss: per PYMNTS, the four firms that bar agents from moving money still allow read-only functions such as checking balances. The line is being drawn at write access to money, not at AI.
Open questions the reporting leaves
How many incidents, and did any cause customer loss?
Were the “independent” actions model misbehavior, prompt injection, or vendor design choices?
Which agent platforms were involved, and did any use an official API rather than screen access?
Why credential-sharing agents break the bank’s security model
A bank’s controls rest on one assumption: the authenticated session belongs to the accountable human. Fraud models, Reg E dispute handling, KYC, call-center verification and step-up authentication all lean on it. A password-holding agent quietly removes that assumption, and four failure modes follow.
1. Identity collapse. The agent presents as the customer. Same credentials, often the same MFA code relayed by the customer. The bank cannot apply agent-specific limits, cannot log agent actions separately, and cannot revoke the agent without locking out the person. In “The Harness Is the Contract,” we put it simply: authorization belongs in code, not in the prompt. Here there is no code the bank controls at all.
2. Screen scraping, reborn with judgment. Banking spent a decade dragging data aggregators off shared passwords and onto tokenized, scoped API access. Agentic browsers reopen that door, with one upgrade attackers will love: the scraper can now make decisions. A read-only aggregator that leaked was a privacy incident. A write-capable agent that misreads a page is a payments incident.
3. Autonomy beyond intent. The reported behavior that alarmed bankers was not theft. It was initiative: agents doing things, like calling the call center, that the customer never requested. In a regulated account, an unrequested action is itself the risk. Who verified the agent’s identity on that call? Which human approved what it said?
4. The confused deputy. An agent that reads statements, payee memos, emails and web pages also reads attacker-controlled text. A crafted transaction description or a poisoned help article can steer it (prompt injection). The bank sees a legitimate, MFA-verified session doing exactly what the attacker wanted. This is why the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications treats agency itself as the security boundary.
There is a fifth, quieter problem: credential concentration. Every consumer agent platform that stores bank passwords becomes a high-value target holding millions of keys. One breach there becomes account takeover everywhere.
Threat model: the bank-account agent against OWASP’s agentic Top 10
Seven of the ten OWASP agentic risk categories show up in this one scenario. That is why a CISO’s first instinct is to block, and why that instinct is defensible.
Agent inherits the customer’s full rights: view, transfer, change payees, contact support
Separate agent identity; scoped, short-lived delegated tokens; read and write as separate grants
ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack (LLM01 Prompt Injection)
Malicious payee memo, statement note or help page redirects the agent’s task
Treat all page content as untrusted; policy checks outside the model before any action
ASI02 Tool Misuse & Exploitation
Agent uses legitimate transfer or bill-pay screens for an unintended purpose
Transaction limits, payee allowlists, destination validation enforced by the bank
ASI10 Rogue Agents
Agent acts beyond instructions, such as calling the call center unprompted
Action allowlist per grant; anomaly detection on agent sessions; kill switch
ASI09 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation
Call-center staff or the customer trust an agent’s claims; customer approves prompts without reading
Agents must self-identify; human approval screens that show the actual action and amount
ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain
Consumer agent vendor stores bank credentials; a vendor breach equals mass account takeover
No credential storage; tokenized access; vendor attestation and due diligence
ASI08 Cascading Failures
One faulty agent update moves deposits across thousands of accounts at once
Rate limits per agent platform; circuit breakers; rapid revocation at the platform level
The pattern in the right-hand column matters. Almost every effective control depends on the bank being able to see that it is talking to an agent. Credential sharing makes that impossible. So blocking is not just risk aversion; it is the only control available until a proper channel exists.
It is not only about security, and that is fine to say
The security case is real, but three other forces are pushing banks in the same direction. Good governance names all of them.
Liability. Under Regulation E, transfers made by someone the consumer gave their access device to can be treated as authorized. Apply that to an agent and the customer may own the loss, not the bank. PNC’s Demchak said outright that agent transactions will need new liability-shifting law. Until the rules are clear, nobody wants to be the test case. (This is a governance observation, not legal advice.)
Deposit flight. An agent that compares rates and moves cash without friction threatens the cheap, sticky deposits banks are built on. Several outlets note banks’ concern that agents could push customer money toward higher-yield accounts. U.S. Bancorp says it has not seen this yet.
Control of the customer relationship. Whoever owns the agent owns the interface. Banks blocking third-party agents while building their own is both prudent and strategic.
Here is the honest read: “security” will sometimes be the polite word for “competition.” That does not make the security risks less real. It does mean regulators, fintechs and customers will push back on blanket bans, especially where open-banking rules such as the CFPB’s Section 1033 framework, itself in flux, give consumers rights to share their data. The durable answer is not a ban. It is a channel that makes agent access safe enough that the security excuse disappears.
The governance lens: frameworks already describe the fix
None of this needs a new framework. ISO/IEC 42001, the NIST AI RMF and existing banking guidance already require what is missing: known agents, scoped authority, human oversight, logging and a way to switch things off. The gap is that customer-invited agents arrive outside every bank’s AI inventory.
Control theme
ISO/IEC 42001
NIST AI RMF 1.0
EU AI Act
US banking expectation
Know every agent touching your systems
6.1.2 AI risk assessment; A.4 resources and inventory
MAP 1, GOVERN 1.6 inventory
Art. 26 deployer duties
FFIEC authentication guidance (2021): know who and what accesses accounts
Third-party agents and their vendors
A.10 third-party and customer relationships
GOVERN 6 third-party risk
Art. 25 value-chain responsibilities
Interagency third-party risk guidance (2023)
Human oversight of consequential actions
A.9 use of AI systems; A.6.2 lifecycle controls
MANAGE 2.4 supersede or deactivate
Art. 14 human oversight (high-risk)
Step-up authentication; dual control on money movement
Agents disclose they are agents
A.8 information for interested parties
GOVERN 4 transparency culture
Art. 50 transparency for AI that interacts with people
Call-center identity verification (UDAAP, fraud)
Traceable actions and evidence
A.6.2.8 event logs
MEASURE 2.8 accountability and transparency
Art. 12 record-keeping
GLBA Safeguards; audit-trail expectations
Kill switch and recovery
A.6.2.6 operation and monitoring
MANAGE 2.4, MANAGE 4
Art. 15 robustness and cybersecurity
Incident response and account restoration playbooks
Two practical notes. First, the EU AI Act column matters for US banks with EU operations and for agent vendors selling into the EU; Article 50’s disclosure duty is a direct answer to an agent quietly calling a call center. Second, in our “When Structure Pays” case study with Frontier Founder, we argued that an oversight checkbox records only the overseer’s statement, not evidence. The same applies here: “customer authorized the agent” is a statement. A signed, scoped, logged delegation grant is evidence.
The middle path: delegated, scoped, attestable agent access
The way out is the same move banking made with data aggregators: replace shared passwords with a channel where the agent is a known party with limited, revocable rights. Every control in the threat model becomes possible the moment the bank can see the agent.
credential sharing vs. a sanctioned agent channel
The top row is what banks are seeing now. The bottom row is what a defensible design looks like, built from five elements:
Agent identity. The agent platform authenticates as itself, separate from the customer, so it can be limited, monitored and revoked on its own.
Scoped delegation. The customer grants a short-lived, revocable token (OAuth 2.1 with PKCE and audience-bound tokens) instead of a password. Read and write are separate grants. These are the same controls we added to ShareVault’s MCP Governance Standard in its v1.1 revision.
Tiered actions, decided in code. The bank’s policy gate, not the model, decides what each grant may do: reads allowed, small writes within limits, money movement held for approval.
Human approval where money moves. The customer confirms the actual payee and amount on their own device. This is Moynihan’s human-in-the-loop, made concrete.
Evidence and a kill switch. Every action is logged against customer, agent, vendor and grant. Revoking the agent does not lock out the customer.
Standards like the Financial Data Exchange API already cover tokenized read access. The unsolved pieces are write scopes, agent attestation and the liability rules that sit behind them.
What this means for SaaS and fintech builders, and for banks
Banks are first, not last. Any B2B SaaS platform with admin consoles, billing, data exports or approvals will soon find agents logging in with a user’s password. Your enterprise customers’ procurement teams will ask how you tell them apart.
If you build or run a SaaS or fintech platform
☐ Can you detect automated sessions that use human credentials today, and do you log them distinctly?
☐ Do your terms of service say whether users may delegate their login to an AI agent?
☐ Do you offer a scoped, revocable delegation path (OAuth, API keys with limited scopes) so users have a safe alternative?
☐ Are read and write permissions granted separately, with money movement, exports and admin changes behind step-up approval?
☐ Are destructive or financial actions rate-limited and value-limited per delegated grant?
☐ Can you revoke one agent without locking out the human?
☐ Is every agent-initiated action attributable in your audit log to user, agent, vendor and grant?
☐ Does your incident runbook cover an agent that misbehaved, including restoration of the account?
If you are a bank or credit union
☐ Add customer-invited agents to your AI risk register, even though you did not deploy them.
☐ Tune bot detection for agentic browsers, not just credential-stuffing scripts.
☐ Require agents that call support lines to identify themselves, and route them to a defined process.
☐ Publish a sanctioned agent channel with read-only scopes first, then tightly limited write scopes.
☐ Run vendor due diligence on agent platforms before allowing them, including credential handling and breach history.
☐ Clarify Reg E and dispute handling for delegated agent actions with counsel, and tell customers plainly.
☐ Tabletop the scenario the banks described: an agent takes a damaging action before anyone can stop it.
A 90-day plan: from blocking to governing
The goal by day 90 is simple: every agent touching your platform is either visible and scoped, or blocked on purpose.
Days 1 to 30: See it. Instrument detection for automated sessions on human credentials. Inventory known agent platforms hitting your login and support channels. Add “customer-invited agents” to the AI risk register and assign an owner. Update terms of service and support scripts.
Days 31 to 60: Decide it. Run a risk assessment on the scenario (ISO/IEC 42001 6.1.2) and set a policy per action class: allow read, gate write, block money movement or admin changes. Tabletop the runaway-agent incident. Draft the delegated-access design: agent identity, scopes, limits, approval UX, revocation.
Days 61 to 90: Channel it. Ship read-only delegated access for one or two vetted agent vendors. Wire agent-level audit logging and a per-agent kill switch. Report the first metrics to leadership: agent sessions detected, blocked, converted to the sanctioned channel, and incidents.
Gate to move past day 90 into write scopes: tested revocation, human approval for any money movement, and vendor due diligence on file.
Perspective: the banks are right, for now
Blocking is the correct short-term call. When you cannot tell an agent from a customer, you cannot apply a single agent-specific control, so the only safe setting is off. Any CISO who allowed write access through shared passwords today would struggle to defend it to an examiner.
But blocking is a holding pattern, not a strategy. Customers will keep handing passwords to agents because the agents are useful, and every block pushes them toward workarounds that are even harder to see. The banks that win will be the ones that make the safe path the easy path: an agent channel with its own identity, narrow scopes, human approval where money moves, and a kill switch that works.
The broader lesson for every regulated SaaS company is that agentic AI is an identity and authorization problem before it is a model problem. Least agency, explicit authorization, separation of user and agent identity, and evidence you can hand an auditor: none of it is new. What is new is that the agent showed up at your login page before your governance program did.
Get ahead of the agent at your login page
DISC InfoSec helps B2B SaaS and financial services firms govern AI agents before a customer, examiner or incident forces the question. We led ShareVault through ISO/IEC 42001 Stage 2 certification on the first attempt and authored its MCP Governance Standard, so we build controls that hold up in an audit, not just on a slide.
Agentic Access Risk Assessment: detection gaps, delegation design, OWASP agentic threat model and a prioritized remediation plan.
AI Governance Quick-Start (7 to 10 days): AI inventory, risk register, policies and oversight evidence aligned to ISO/IEC 42001 and NIST AI RMF.
vCISO / vCAIO retainer: ongoing ownership of AI and security governance through certification and beyond.
Disc, Principal Consultant, DISC InfoSec · CISSP, CISM, ISO/IEC 42001 Lead Implementer, ISO/IEC 27001 Lead Implementer
info@deurainfosec.com · (707) 998-5164 · Book a call
Publishing kit
Field
Value
SEO title (58 chars)
US Banks Block AI Agents: What It Means for AI Governance
Meta description
Major US banks are blocking third-party AI agents in customer accounts. The threat model, governance crosswalk and a 90-day plan for SaaS and fintech.
Slug
us-banks-blocking-third-party-ai-agents
Primary keyword
AI agents bank accounts
Secondary keywords
agentic AI security, OWASP agentic top 10, ISO 42001 AI agents, delegated access, AI governance financial services
Category / tags
AI Governance; AI Security; Financial Services; Agentic AI
LinkedIn copy
Major US banks are finding third-party AI agents inside customer accounts, logging in with the customer’s own password. Some reportedly acted beyond what the customer asked.
The banks are blocking them. They are right to, for now.
This is not an AI problem first. It is an identity problem: when an agent looks exactly like the customer, you cannot apply a single agent-specific control.
In the new post I cover the OWASP agentic threat model, an ISO 42001 / NIST AI RMF / EU AI Act crosswalk, and a 90-day plan for SaaS and fintech teams. Your login page is next.
Traditional vs. Agent Frameworks: Same Dimensions, Different Liabilities
Oct 16, 2026 · @disc
Why the agent shift is a liability shift
Agent frameworks move the most important decisions in your software from build time to runtime, and from your developers to a model. Every control you built for traditional software assumed the opposite.
In traditional software, a developer wrote every route, wired every API, and shipped every behavior change through code review and a release. If an auditor asked “why did the system do that?”, the answer was in the code.
In an agent framework, the LLM decides at runtime which tools to call and in what order. It reads tool schemas and picks for itself. It stores and retrieves its own memory. Its behavior changes when someone edits a system prompt, with no redeployment. It can hand work to other agents.
The dimensions are the same: control flow, tool orchestration, memory, behavior change, and coordination. The philosophy is completely different. So are the risks, the governance obligations, and the evidence you will need when something goes wrong.
This post walks through each dimension and shows what breaks, which threats move in, what ISO/IEC 42001, ISO/IEC 27001, the EU AI Act and the NIST AI RMF expect, and what you must log to prove control. The rule that ties it together: never let model output be the only thing standing between an instruction and a privileged action.
The five dimensions, and what each one breaks
1. Control flow: from build time to runtime
Traditional software is deterministic. You can enumerate its paths, test them, and point to the line of code behind any outcome. An agent’s path is chosen per request by a model reading untrusted input. You cannot test every path, because the paths do not exist until the model invents them.
The risk is goal hijack. A document, email, web page or ticket the agent reads can carry instructions that redirect it. The model cannot reliably tell your instructions from an attacker’s, because both arrive as text.
The control is to separate planning from execution. Let the model propose; let a deterministic policy layer outside the model decide whether the action is allowed. Add action budgets, a kill switch, and human approval for anything irreversible.
2. Tool orchestration: the schema is the attack surface
A hardcoded API call only does what the developer wrote. An agent reads tool names, descriptions and parameter schemas and chooses for itself. That means the tool description is an instruction to the model. A malicious or compromised MCP server can poison it, and a legitimate tool can be called with parameters nobody intended.
The risks are tool misuse, unexpected code execution, and supply-chain compromise through third-party tools, skills and MCP servers.
The controls are a registry of approved tools with pinned versions, typed and validated parameters, authorization checked before every execution, sandboxing for code, and a supplier review for every MCP server. A tool the agent can discover at runtime is a dependency you never assessed.
3. Memory: persistent context is persistent compromise
In traditional software, the developer decides what is stored and where. In an agent framework, memory is tiered (in-context, vector, episodic) and the framework decides what is retrieved. A poisoned entry written once can steer every future session.
Memory also creates privacy and retention obligations most teams miss. Personal data in a vector store is still personal data. A deletion request must reach the embeddings, the episodic store, and the caches, not just the source table.
The controls are provenance and trust labels on every memory write, write authorization, expiry dates, quarantine and rollback, and a retention period for each memory tier.
This is the line on the slide that should worry a CISO most. In traditional software, changing behavior requires a code change, review, testing, and a release. In an agent framework, editing a system prompt or a tool description changes production behavior immediately.
That convenience bypasses change management entirely. A prompt edit can remove a guardrail, widen a tool’s use, or change who the agent serves, with no ticket, no approval, and no record of the version that made a disputed decision.
The control is to treat prompts, tool descriptions and agent configuration as production code. Version them, require approval, test them before release, and log which version was live for every action. A material change should also trigger a fresh risk assessment.
5. Multi-agent coordination: accountability gets lost in delegation
Traditional microservices talk through contracts the developer designed. Agent frameworks let one agent call another as a tool, in hierarchies that can be built or changed at runtime. Each hop is a trust boundary, and each one can launder authority.
The risks are insecure inter-agent messages, privilege abuse through delegated credentials, and cascading failures where one agent’s error is amplified by the next. The “confused deputy” problem returns at scale: a low-privilege agent asks a high-privilege agent to do what it cannot.
The controls are a unique identity for every agent, short-lived scoped credentials, authenticated and validated messages, bounded delegation depth, circuit breakers, and a trace ID that follows a request across every agent it touches.
At a glance: same dimensions, different liabilities
Dimension
Traditional software
Agent framework
What breaks
Control that must live outside the model
Control flow
Developer defines every route at build time
LLM chooses tools and order at runtime
Untestable paths; goal hijack through untrusted content
Policy engine authorizes every action; action budgets; kill switch
Tool orchestration
Hardcoded endpoints
Agent reads schemas and selects tools
Tool descriptions become instructions; tool misuse; MCP supply chain
All ten risks in the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications enter through one of the five dimensions above. Use this table to see where each threat comes in and which control blocks it.
OWASP risk
Enters through
What it looks like
Primary control
ASI01 Agent goal hijack
Control flow
A retrieved document tells the agent to email the data room index to an outside address
Isolate untrusted content; validate actions against policy, not model intent
ASI02 Tool misuse
Tool orchestration
A legitimate export tool is called with a destination nobody approved
Destination allowlists; authorization before execution; transaction limits
ASI03 Identity and privilege abuse
Multi-agent coordination
An agent reuses a user’s long-lived token or a shared service account
Two design patterns should be treated as critical findings by default: an agent approving its own high-impact action, and an agent controlling the monitoring or logging that watches it. Both turn an attack into an invisible one.
Scope the controls to the agent’s risk. An assistive agent that drafts text needs far less than one that touches production systems, regulated data, or money. Tier your agents first, then apply the full baseline to the ones that can act on their own.
What the frameworks expect from agents
None of the major frameworks has an “agent” chapter, but each one already covers the five dimensions once you map them. The gap is rarely the standard; it is that agent controls are left to engineering and never written into the management system.
Dimension
ISO/IEC 42001
ISO/IEC 27001
EU AI Act
NIST AI RMF
Control flow
A.6.2.6 operation and monitoring; A.9 responsible use
A.8.16 monitoring activities
Art. 14 human oversight; Art. 15 accuracy, robustness, cybersecurity
A.7 data for AI systems, including A.7.5 provenance
A.5.34 privacy and PII; A.8.10 information deletion
Art. 10 data governance (high-risk)
MAP 4 risks from data and third-party components
Behavior change
A.6.2.5 deployment; Cl. 6.3 planning of changes
A.8.32 change management
Art. 12 logging across the system’s lifetime
MEASURE 3 tracking risk over time
Multi-agent coordination
A.5 impact assessment; Cl. 6.1 risk treatment
A.5.15 access control; A.8.2 privileged access
Art. 26 deployer obligations
GOVERN 1.6 AI system inventory
Three points matter most for agent programs.
Inventory the agents, not just the models. ISO 42001 and NIST GOVERN 1.6 both expect an inventory of AI systems. For agents, each entry should record the tools, credentials, memory stores, connected agents and MCP servers it uses. A model inventory alone misses most of the attack surface.
A prompt change is a change. ISO 27001 A.8.32 and ISO 42001 A.6.2.5 do not exempt configuration that happens to be written in English. Auditors will ask how a system prompt reached production and who approved it.
The EU AI Act clock still applies. The AI Omnibus deferred stand-alone high-risk obligations to 2 December 2027, and Annex I systems to 2 August 2028. Article 50 transparency duties largely still apply. An agent that makes or shapes consequential decisions about people will need 2027-grade logging and oversight, and logs cannot be created retroactively.
Need a hand?
DISC InfoSec helps B2B SaaS and financial services firms build evidence that holds up under ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 42001, the EU AI Act, and the NIST AI RMF. We led Virtual Data Room through ISO/IEC 42001 Stage 2 certification on the first attempt, including its AI log retention and records management standard.