Jul 23 2023

Citrix ADC zero-day exploitatation: CISA releases details about attack on CI organization (CVE-2023-3519)

Category: CISA,Zero daydisc7 @ 9:40 am

The exploitation of the Citrix NetScaler ADC zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2023-3519) was first spotted by a critical infrastructure organization, who reported it to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).

“In June 2023, threat actors exploited this vulnerability as a zero-day to drop a webshell on a critical infrastructure organization’s non-production environment NetScaler ADC appliance. The webshell enabled the actors to perform discovery on the victim’s active directory (AD) and collect and exfiltrate AD data. The actors attempted to move laterally to a domain controller but network-segmentation controls for the appliance blocked movement,” the agency shared in an advisory published on Thursday.

IoCs, IR and mitigation advice

The attack was reported to CISA and Citrix in July 2023, and Citrix announced fixes for it on July 18.

The security bulletin mentioned that “exploits of CVE-2023-3519 on unmitigated appliances have been observed,” but no additional details about the attacks or how to check whether an organizations had been a target had been publicly shared.

A list of indicators of compromise (IoCs) had been shared with select organizations, under the understanding that the info would not be widely shared (i.e., that the contents would be restricted to those organization and shared with its clients “on a need-to-know basis”).

“As we hear from the Citrix community, more and more attacked systems are being found. The first exploits have also been available for purchase on the dark web for some time,” German IT consultant Manuel Winkel said on July 19.

He shared advice on how to check whether one’s organization has been hit, and advised on what to do if the result is positive.

CISA’s advisory offers more details about the threat actor activity in the attack detected at the critical infrastructure organization, delineates attack detection methods, and offers advice on incident response if compromise is detected.

In-the-wild exploitation of CVE-2023-3519

Greynoise has created a tag to show in-the-wild probing of internet-facing NetScaler ADC platforms and Gateways with authentication attempts through CVE-2023-3519, but so far there have been no detections.

Standalone and Nmap scripts for identifying vulnerable installations have been published on GitHub.

If what Winkel says is true – namely, that first exploits for CVE-2023-3519 have been available for purchase on the dark web for a while – it’s possible that there are many compromised organizations out there who didn’t manage to block the attackers’ lateral movement.

It’s currently impossible to say what the attackers’ ultimate goal is, but affected organizations may discover it soon if they don’t react quickly.

UPDATE (July 22, 2023, 10:55 a.m. ET):

Technical analyses of the flaw are now public and threat actors could use them to create a reliable exploit soon. Patch quickly!

Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon


InfoSec books
 | InfoSec tools | InfoSec services

Tags: Citrix ADC, Countdown to Zero Day, CVE-2023-3519, Stuxnet, zero Day


Feb 13 2023

Multiple 0-Day Attacks in The PyPI Packages Aimed to Steal Developer Credentials

Category: Python,Zero dayDISC @ 10:13 am

Recently, the FortiGuard Labs team made a groundbreaking discovery of several new zero-day attacks in the PyPI packages. The source of these attacks was traced back to a malware author known as “Core1337.” This individual had published a number of packages.

Here below we have mentioned the packages that are published by Core1337:-

  • 3m-promo-gen-api
  • Ai-Solver-gen
  • hypixel-coins
  • httpxrequesterv2
  • httpxrequester

Between the 27th of January and the 29th of January 2023, these attacks were published. The recent discovery made by the FortiGuard Labs team revealed that each of the packages published by the malware author “Core1337” had only one version with an empty description. 

However, what was alarming was the fact that all of these packages contained similar malicious code. This raises the question of the level of sophistication and the intentions behind these attacks. 

Technical Analysis of the Packages

First of all, cybersecurity analysts have noticed something that looks like a URL for a webhook in its setup[.]py file:-

  • hxxps://discord[.]com/api/webhooks/1069214746395562004/sejnJnNA3lWgkWC4V86RaFzaiUQ3dIAG958qwAUkLCkYjJ7scZhoa-KkRgBOhQw8Ecqd

There is a similar code in each package’s setup.py file except for the URL of the webhook that is sent from each package. It appears that the URL in question may have a connection to the infamous “Spidey Bot” malware. 

This particular strain of malware is notorious for its ability to pilfer personal information via Discord, as highlighted in a recent blog post by the organization. The blog, entitled “Web3-Essential Package,” delves into the dangers posed by the “Spidey Bot.”

Experts in the field have discovered potential malicious behaviors in a recent static analysis that was conducted by reviewing the setup.py script. During this process, the experts meticulously examined the code and were able to identify several key indicators that point toward malicious intent.

Experts in the field of malware analysis have gained a general understanding of the behavior of a particular strain of malware by carefully examining its primary function. 

According to their findings, this malware may attempt to extract sensitive information from various browsers and the Discord platform and then store it in a file for later exfiltration.

In order to gain a better understanding of the inner workings of this piece of malware, experts have focused their attention on the “getPassw” function. This function is specifically designed to gather user and password information from the browser and then save it to a text file.

The malware has a self-proclaimed title of “Fade Stealer,” which it prominently displays in the form of its name being written at the top of its accompanying text file.

As for its ‘getCookie’ function, the behavior is similar to the one seen in its other functions. Based on the functions of “Kiwi,” “KiwiFile,” and “uploadToAnonfiles,” it appears that the malware is programmed to scan specific directories and select specific file names for the purpose of transferring them through a file-sharing platform:- 

  • https[:]//transfer[.]sh

All these packages have one thing in common – they possess similar codes that are created for the purpose of launching attacks. While all these packages may have different names, the underlying intention and code structure is the same, which indicates the work of a single author.

Full Stack Python Security: Cryptography, TLS, and attack resistance

Tags: zero Day